U.S. presidential campaign and India

http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/11/stories/2007061103341100.htm

Hindu June 11 2007

 

U.S. presidential campaign and India

Derek Chollet

The strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats.

WITH THE U.S. 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, nearly 20 Republican and Democratic contenders (and possibly more to join soon) are already crisscrossing the country and outlining their policy positions and platforms. This frenzy of campaigning even seems early for most Americans, but for those abroad — in India and elsewhere — it is worth asking: how does this matter to us?

All American presidential elections are consequential, but the next one seems more so. For the first time in over 50 years, no incumbent President or Vice President is in the race, making this a truly open contest to be the first post-Bush, post-9/11 President. The next President — whether Republican or Democrat — will have an opportunity to assess the successes and failures of the Bush years, and then change course accordingly.

It is fair to expect that after 2009, the world will witness a major readjustment of American foreign policy across many issues.

Every new administration spends its first few years dealing with the difficult inheritance of its predecessor, and Mr. Bush's successor will have his or her hands full — from winding down the disastrous Iraq war to reversing the animosity toward the U.S. around the world. Most analysts concede that when it comes to America's place in the world, Mr. Bush's successor will face the most difficult circumstances in U.S. history. That's why it's so significant that one of the good news stories a new U.S. administration will inherit is a relationship with India that is stronger than ever before.

For this reason, the U.S.' relationship with India will not be a major issue in the 2008 campaign. So far, the subject has hardly been mentioned at all. But it's fair to ask: what would a change in administration, especially to a Democratic one, mean for India? There are some who believe that because of Democratic concerns about nuclear proliferation (the former U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill, derides them as nonproliferation "ayatollahs") and trade issues, a Democratic victory in November 2008 would somehow be bad for India or set our relationship back.

There is always a temptation for a new President to make his mark by doing the opposite of his predecessor. George W. Bush did this with his "ABC" — anything but Clinton — attitude after he took office, and the next Democrat in the White House will have plenty of incentive to return the favour. But importantly, the U.S. relationship with India was an exception to this in 2001, and there are powerful reasons to expect the same in 2009.

Importantly, the strong U.S.-India relationship has deep support from both Republicans and Democrats. While many Bush officials like to herald their work as opening a new era in U.S.-India relations, most Democrats see the past seven years as a continuation of the course set by President Bill Clinton in the late 1990s. To be sure, steps such as the nuclear deal are historic breakthroughs, and these have strong support from most Democrats — especially the dominant presidential contenders. The fact is that the strong U.S.-India relationship is one of the great bipartisan achievements since the end of the Cold War. At a moment where American politics is so soured by partisanship, that's no small feat.

Trade issues

While trade issues remain a point of anxiety for many Democratic constituents and politicians — and the campaign might produce some heated rhetoric — there is broad recognition of how important the economic relationship with India is. The Democratic presidential contenders recognise that outsourcing is a fact of the global economy, and instead of talking about ending trade or building economic walls with India, they talk about ensuring that the government does more to help those who suffer most. In fact, one could argue that because of their credibility with labour unions and working Americans, Democrats are better positioned to put U.S,-India trade relations on a solid footing.

Democrats have also raised concerns about the deep problems of India's neighbour, Pakistan. The Bush administration has pursued unprecedented cooperation with Islamabad — showering Musharraf with $10 billion in aid since 2002 — in exchange for cooperation in fighting terrorism. Yet most Democrats believe such cooperation has been too episodic, and that the peace deals Islamabad recently signed with pro-Taliban elders in western Pakistan have amounted to a failed policy and a Musharraf retreat. Democrats are concerned over negative trend lines in Pakistan — the lack of democracy, rising anti-Americanism, and deep social tensions. And they are alarmed that the vast majority of U.S. assistance money to Pakistan's military is going to weapons that are more appropriate for confrontation with India than rooting out Al-Qaeda. A new administration would reassess this policy and look for ways to fix it.

But most important, Democratic presidential contenders (and those who would staff their administrations) realise that in a world where the U.S. has far fewer friends and seems more isolated than ever before, the U.S.-Indian partnership can be a foundation for greater American engagement in Asia and beyond.

They believe in working to give India the place of leadership it deserves as the world's largest democracy — whether by including it on the U.N. Security Council, or as a founding member of a new "Alliance of Democracies."

In short, no serious Democrat is talking about undoing the great work the past two Presidents have done to strengthen U.S.-Indian relations. If anything, they are planning for a more ambitious agenda. So as one of the most interesting American presidential elections unfolds, America's friends in India should watch with close interest — and with the confidence in our strong partnership.

(Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at The Center for a New American Security and served in the State Department during the Clinton Administration.)

from the May 30, 2007 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0530/p03s01-usfp.html

China, nuclear technology, and a US sale

Critics of a deal to sell China cutting-edge reactors hope to stall it in Congress by questioning the sale's taxpayer-backed financing.

By Mark Clayton | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

China has its heart set on buying a cutting-edge US design for a nuclear-power reactor, and the Bush administration has said it is willing to sell because the transaction will mean jobs for Americans and pave the way for a "nuclear [power] renaissance in the US."

But critics of the mammoth $5 billion-plus sale are raising concerns that China might not use the advanced technology strictly for peaceful purposes, perhaps intending to "reverse engineer" pieces of it for military purposes.

That worry surfaced this month in a letter four members of Congress sent to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The May 18 letter asked whether the sale of four nuclear-power reactors to China, approved by the administration in December, could end up enhancing Beijing's military, including its ability to produce nuclear fuel for bombs and increase the stealthiness of its submarines.

"This transaction presents potential security concerns that Congress will have to consider," wrote Reps. Jeff Fortenberry (R) of Nebraska, Ed Royce (R) of California, Christopher Smith (R) of New Jersey, and Diane Watson (D) of California. All serve on foreign or international relations committees of the House of Representatives.

The sale of US civilian nuclear technology to China has long been a matter of contention. The debate is intensifying now because Westinghouse Electric Co. is expected within weeks to apply for up to $5 billion in loans from the US Export-Import Bank to finance the sale of the reactors to China. When it comes, the application will trigger a review by Congress, where critics of the deal hope to raise enough questions about it to hold it up, perhaps for good.

If approved, the deal would be the largest by far in the history of the bank, a taxpayer-supported entity charged with creating and sustaining jobs by financing sales of US goods to international buyers.

Besides security, an array of concerns

Though security concerns are paramount, any congressional hearings on the deal are likely to address the following sensitive topics, as well:

•Financing of the sale. Should US taxpayers be financing a multibillion-dollar loan to China at a time when China is running a massive trade surplus with the US? What do the taxpayers, who by some estimates contributed at least $300 million to Westinghouse Electric's advanced reactor design, get out of the deal – especially considering that a Japanese firm now owns 77 percent of Westinghouse?

•Technology transfer. China reportedly will get most of the new AP1000 technology, the latest US reactor design, as part of the sale. Some nonproliferation experts say the design of the reactor's coolant pump is of particular concern, and that China might be able to reverse-engineer it for use on its nuclear submarines. Westinghouse spokesman Vaugn Gilbert, though, says the company is bound by a federal technology transfer agreement "that precludes certain elements of that pump technology from being provided to China – therefore we will not be providing it."

Experts are concerned about the technology transfer issue and whether the sale will compromise America's technological lead on nuclear-power systems for subs.

"You're building an infrastructure that can be used and retooled to help out in [China's] naval reactor sector – and they do want this for nuclear subs," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a think tank on nuclear-policy issues.

Because China is already a nuclear-weapon nation, others don't see a problem with sharing US light-water power-reactor technology, a design considered less useful for making bomb fuel. But they do have other worries.

"Our concern is more about whether the US should be supporting building a commercial nuclear infrastructure when there are serious questions about whether the Chinese regulatory system [for nuclear-waste disposal] can do this safely," says Edwin Lyman, a nonproliferation expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, an environmental group.

A boon to US industry?

Westinghouse and administration officials say the sale is economically justified and concerns about technology transfer unwarranted.

"This deal ... would affirm that the US remains a leader in the design and construction of civilian nuclear-power plants," said David Pumphrey, a deputy assistant secretary at the Department of Energy (DOE) in February testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. It would also create "some 5,500 new jobs in the US," he said. He echoed DOE Secretary Samuel Bodman, who spoke in December of the deal's potential to "spur development of a nuclear renaissance in the US."

Westinghouse's Mr. Gilbert says a key benefit is simply getting the new design working the first time in China, thereby working out any glitches and lowering costs for at least 10 new plants in the US that would use the same design.

To some, however, it's unclear how much the US benefits or whether the technology will help China's military. Others question whether the deal will create enough US jobs to merit billions in public financing.

"You've got the Japanese making most of the big parts, [and] the Chinese doing at least half the construction and absorbing all the technology to do it themselves later on," Mr. Sokolski says. "I fail to see any boon to US industry."

"We don't think these economic impact and jobs estimates are done very well," says Thea Lee, policy chief for the AFL-CIO, who sits on the advisory board of Export-Import Bank. "It's been our sense that the bank's process of verifying such claims is very inadequate and that there's a lot of phony job-padding going on."

Westinghouse officials say the deal will "load Westinghouse design centers" in Pennsylvania and other states with work and create positions in 20 states – to the tune of about 5,000 jobs.

Though the deal doesn't sit all that well with Lawrence Wortzel, a commissioner with the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, he does not favor blocking it.

"While I have reservations about the financing and technology transfer to third parties, I still wouldn't recommend taking action to block the sale," he says, noting that China certainly has the money to finance the deal itself and has a huge trade surplus with the US.

Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and related links

The Return of Reprocessing

Nuclear Wasteland

 

IEEE article on the return of reprocessing

 

 

http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/4891

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Wasteland

By: Peter Fairley

PHOTO:Roger Ressmeyer/Corbis

BLUE GLOW OF SUCCESS: Fuel assemblies cool in a water pond at the French nuclear ­complex at La Hague. The blue light is ­generated by Cherenkov radiation, which arises from a ­particle's traveling through a medium faster than the speed of light in that medium

For roughly a quarter century there has been a hiatus in nuclear-plant construction in Europe and North America. Now new plants are being built in France, Finland, and Russia, and new reactor proposals are gathering steam in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. But to undergo a true resurgence—which many analysts argue is necessary to help reduce global greenhouse gas emissions—the nuclear power industry needs a coherent plan for dealing with its reactors' radioactive and toxic leftovers.

Burying the waste is a slow, politically painful process that leaves much to be desired. The long-planned U.S. repository under Yucca Mountain in Nevada has been immensely controversial. Yet if built as currently planned, it may be too small when it finally opens to accommodate all the high-level waste that has piled up in the country during half a century of commercial nuclear energy.

Lately, nuclear advocates, particularly in the United States, say they've found a better solution, or at least a path to one. It's based on the recycling and reuse of spent nuclear fuel, known as fuel reprocessing in the industry's jargon. Reprocessing breaks down fuel chemically, recovering fissionable material for use in new fuels. Thus, there is less highly radioactive material that needs to be sealed in caskets, buried deep underground, or otherwise permanently isolated from humankind.

"If we do reprocessing and recycle, we can increase the capacity of Yucca Mountain 100-fold," says Phillip Finck, a nuclear engineer at Argonne National Laboratory, in Illinois. Suddenly, instead of being crammed full on its opening day, Yucca Mountain would be able to handle everything the industry could throw at it until 2050 or beyond, staving off searches for additional Yucca Mountains.

As it happens, there's an ideal test case with which to evaluate that enticing proposition: France, which never backed away from nuclear energy and which has long relied on reprocessing as the linchpin of its power reactor fuel system.

The French experience clearly does show that reprocessing need not be the dangerous mess that other countries, including the United States, have made of it [see photo, "Blue Glow of Success"]. The U.S. military used reprocessing for several decades to separate plutonium from spent fuels, providing fissionable material for bombs. The result was widespread contamination—which has been in some cases irremediable—in the central Washington desert and the South Carolina coastal plain.

France, in contrast, now reprocesses well over 1000 metric tons of spent fuel every year without incident at the La Hague chemical complex, at the head of Normandy's wind-blasted Cotentin peninsula. La Hague receives all the spent fuel rods from France's 59 reactors. The sprawling facility, operated by the state-controlled nuclear giant Areva, has racked up a good, if not unblemished, environmental record.

The United States now claims to have a way of eliminating reprocessing's other major liability: the risk of spreading a supply of raw materials for bomb making. The United States officially banned reprocessing of spent fuel for power reactors in 1977, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, who feared that proliferation of reprocessing technology would make it too easy for wayward nations or even terrorist groups to obtain the raw material for bombs. But in recent years, the U.S. Department of Energy engineers, including Finck, have developed an approach that they claim is more resistant to terrorist misuse, thereby mitigating concerns about nuclear security and proliferation. The result is that, three decades later, pressure is mounting for another look at reprocessing. The U.S. government is already supplying recycled fuels to one commercial reactor and planning tests of new proliferation-resistant reprocessing technologies.

Nevertheless, although it may be safe to proceed with reprocessing, France's experience suggests that reprocessing as done now is not ready to catalyze a full-blown nuclear renaissance. The problem in a nutshell is that without breeder reactors, which can break down the most long-lived elements in nuclear waste, reprocessing comes nowhere near achieving Finck's 100-fold reduction in that waste.

France's engineers tried harder than those in any other country to build and run breeder reactors reliably at a commercial scale, but ultimately they failed. The result is that even in France—the best real-world model of what reprocessing can accomplish—the technology remains a tantalizing but only partial solution to the problem of high-level nuclear waste.

Reprocessing got its start in the early 1940s, when Manhattan Project scientists sought a way to isolate pure plutonium. According to Richard Rhodes, author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1986), the chemist Glenn Seaborg, the discoverer of plutonium, came up with the basic concept. A carrier molecule grabs onto plutonium that's in a particular chemical state. That allows the carrier and the plutonium to be separated from the rest of the spent fuel. Further chemistry releases the carrier, leaving a solution of nearly pure plutonium.

It was a risky endeavor from the start because of the volatile, intensely radioactive materials involved. When it was scaled up at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state to obtain the quantities of plutonium needed for bombs, immense concrete bunkers were built to house the operations [see "The Atomic Fortress That Time Forgot," IEEE Spectrum, April 2006]. The workers called them Queen Marys, after the British ocean liner, the world's biggest at the time. Inside, all the processing steps were done entirely by remote control, with technicians peering through thick windows at the machinery that moved materials through the chemical tanks. It was all part of what Bertrand Goldschmidt, an eminent French chemist who worked with Seaborg, called "the astonishing American creation in three years"—a network of laboratories and factories equivalent in size to the whole U.S. auto industry.

France's Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA), a ­government organization, commissioned its first reprocessing plant in 1958 at Marcoule, in the south, to supply weapons-grade plutonium for the country's nascent atomic bomb program. It added an initial reprocessing unit at La Hague for the same purpose in the early 1960s. The equipment running today, however, dates mostly to a massive upgrade and expansion begun in the 1970s and 1980s. France cut a deal with five countries—Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—to finance the modernization of La Hague. In exchange, France agreed to reprocess those countries' spent fuel and return their separated plutonium, so as to reduce high-level waste volumes and provide additional fresh nuclear fuel. Today, the Areva Group, a spin-off of the CEA, runs La Hague as well as other French fuel-cycle installations and builds reactors via a subsidiary it co-owns with Siemens.

Even some of the nuclear industry's most tenacious opponents acknowledge that the result is a technical marvel. The leader of Greenpeace France's antinuclear program, Yannick Rousselet, says he no longer cites technical challenges in his criticism of Areva. "In the past," Rousselet says, "the antinuclear movement tried to say that they would not succeed with reprocessing. But they succeeded. To be honest, at least in terms of the technical aspects, it works."

Activists such as Rousselet had reason to doubt La Hague's chemistry, essentially the same as the separation process developed by the Manhattan Project. It has proved an ecological, occupational, and humanitarian disaster nearly everywhere else. Spills and explosions at reprocessing plants in the United States, Russia, and Britain have polluted rivers and contaminated hundreds of thousands of acres. Britain's Sellafield reprocessing complex, on England's Cumbrian coast, was shuttered in April 2005 after safety authorities discovered that 83 cubic meters of highly radioactive liquids had spilled during a period of nine months.

La Hague, in contrast, has never had a serious accident or spill. It does intentionally release relatively small amounts of radioactive substances into the air and water of the adjacent English Channel, whose strong currents were a key attraction of the La Hague site—behavior that Rousselet calls irresponsible and unwarranted. But the amounts released are below licensed levels and are dropping.

Eric Blanc, the marine engineer turned chemical plant operator who serves as La Hague's deputy director, tells the growing stream of visiting U.S. politicos and utility executives that La Hague's neighbors experience an annual radiation dose below 0.02 millisieverts—roughly equivalent to the dose of solar radiation the visitors receive on their transatlantic flights. La Hague's 5000 workers absorb less radiation than they would if they were employed at a nuclear power plant.

LA Hague takes exposure seriously, nevertheless. Inside the plant, there's a bit of the atmosphere of a James Bond movie. Protection suits and respirators hang on the walls. Scores of workers in white jumpsuits sit at computer screens in a central control room, while others control radiation-resistant robots or dexterous telemanipulators to guide, clean, or repair the equipment. The robots are in the thick of the action, and the danger lies safely isolated behind walls and leaded-glass windows 1 to 2 meters thick in workshops that have not seen a human in two decades of heavy-industrial operation.

Reprocessing at La Hague takes place in two independent but interconnected lines. At the front end of each line, robotic assemblies lift spent fuel-rod bundles weighing 500 kilograms from armored shipping casks and suspend them in 9-meter-deep pools of water. The fuel bundles are at 300 °C; after cooling for four to five years, the fuel elements are fed into the plant's processing workshops to be chewed up, dissolved in nitric acid, and run through a series of chemical separation baths. The chemistry is fundamentally the 63-year-old Purex process developed in the Manhattan Project—Purex stands for "plutonium-uranium extraction"—but Areva says the separation equipment employed is more compact than its predecessors and generates less waste.

The major products of the separation are uranium and plutonium. The former, consisting of the isotopes U-235 and U-238, constitutes 95 percent of the spent fuel. The plutonium yield is just a little more than 1 percent. Most of the uranium is shipped to an Areva plant in southern France and, at the moment, stockpiled. Some analysts predict that uranium prices will eventually justify more reuse of La Hague's uranium; but for now, utilities find it cheaper to use fuel freshly made from uranium ores and enriched to the precise isotopic composition they need. As for the plutonium, it is shipped across France to the Rhône Valley, where Areva's Marcoule fuel plant blends it with uranium and fabricates it into fuel for French reactors.

The final step in the process encapsulates the high-level waste, which consists mainly of acids and solvents from the Purex process plus dangerous, extremely radioactive leftovers from the spent fuel, including isotopes of curium, cesium, and iodine. This step is called vitrification. Technicians operating remote manipulators drop the toxic blend into a bath of borosilicate glass heated to 1150 °C, then dole out the molten mix into 180-liter stainless-steel canisters. Think of a huge glass paperweight with radioactive matter inside instead of colored swirls. But this particular glass is not fragile, Blanc explains. That's the point: the glass is supposed to immobilize the isotopes, isolating them from the environment, like bugs in amber, for thousands of years.

Once processed, two bundles totaling 528 fuel rods yield one vitrification canister 1.3 meters tall and a bit less than half a meter in diameter, plus another steel canister of similar size holding the compacted metal fuel rods. Even the largest of France's reactors, which can produce 1300 megawatts, generate just 20 canisters of high-level waste per year. According to Areva, it's about a factor of 10 reduction in the mass of highly radioactive waste needing to be stored under the most stringent conditions, and a four- or fivefold reduction in volume relative to leaving a plant's spent fuel unseparated [see flowchart, " The French Nuclear System"].

Despite its record of technical success, La Hague's business lost much of its shine during the past decade. By the mid-1990s, France's European partners were rethinking the wisdom of their investment in La Hague and, one by one, stopped shipping their spent fuel. From its 1997 to 1998 peak of 1700 metric tons per year, La Hague's throughput sharply decreased by 2003 to an average of 1100 metric tons per year. In part, France's partners were responding to grassroots concerns about the security of spent fuel and plutonium shipments [see sidebar, "The Terrorist Threat"]. But the ultimate cause for the slump traces back to the demise of the next-generation reactors designed to consume La Hague's plutonium, the so-called fast breeders.

All reactors get their heat from bundles of rods filled with a fissile fuel. The rods are inserted into a core in close proximity to each other, enabling neutrons radiating from the fuel in each rod to split heavy atoms of uranium or plutonium in neighboring rods, thereby generating more neutrons, which split more atoms, and so on. In most conventional power reactors, water or graphite is employed as a moderator to slow down the neutrons, thus rendering them more likely to be absorbed by U-235 atoms, knocking out more neutrons. That is necessary because the concentration of fissionable material in the fuel is low, just a few percent. In contrast, breeder reactor fuel contains a high fraction of fissionable material, so that a moderator is not required.

There is an additional potential advantage to the breeder reactor. By surrounding the fuel rods in its core with a jacket of U‑238, which is not fissionable by slow neutrons, the reactor can produce power and simultaneously "breed" new plutonium faster than the plutonium in the fuel rods is consumed. The U‑238 atoms capture neutrons to form fissile plutonium 239.

The reason for expanding La Hague in the 1980s was to produce a first load of plutonium fuel for what was to be a fleet of breeder reactors. Energy analysts, alarmed by the oil-supply manipulations of the 1970s, had predicted a rush into nuclear power that would exhaust uranium reserves in a matter of decades. "We were projecting that by 2010 nothing but fast [breeder] reactors would be built," recalls one such analyst, Evelyne Bertel, an expert in nuclear fuel cycles at the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency, in Paris.

The United States and the Soviet Union both mounted major efforts to develop breeder reactors during the 1950s and 1960s. But it fell to France, after Carter took the United States out of the reprocessing and breeding game, to design and build the first commercial prototype.

In 1972, a consortium of companies led by the French utility Electricité de France (EDF) started work on the Superphénix. There were countless challenges. Above all was keeping the breeder's densely packed core from overheating, which could cause the fuel to melt and possibly even explode. Because the heat flux is so high in a breeder and absorption of neutrons by a moderator is undesirable, reactor designers faced a limited choice of coolants. In practice, almost all breeder designers have opted for liquid metals that are notoriously hard to handle. Liquid sodium, used in the Superphénix, is extremely corrosive and ignites explosively on contact with oxygen or water.

Starting in the mid-1980s, the Superphénix suffered a series of sodium leaks. Meanwhile the nuclear industry peaked and uranium prices crashed, eliminating the imperative to switch to plutonium fuel. The reactor went through several shutdowns and restarts before the French government finally pulled the plug for good in 1998. By then the reactor had run just 174 days at its full 1250-MW design capacity. A French government investigation in 2000 estimated that the project had cost about €9 billion (US $11.8 billion).

French industry players often blame politics for the Superphénix debacle. François Mitterrand, then president, held power through a coalition with France's staunchly antinuclear Green Party. However, the technical problems are undeniable. "The experience of Superphénix demonstrated that France built a nonmature technology," says Bertel.

With breeder reactors out of the picture for the foreseeable future, France tried to find a new role for La Hague's plutonium. The solution was to re-engineer Areva's fuel assembly plant at Marcoule, originally designed to make fuel bundles for the Superphénix, to instead produce plutonium-enriched fuel elements for conventional reactors. By blending plutonium and depleted uranium, in a ratio of 8 percent to 92 percent, the plant created so-called mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel, which can be substituted for enriched uranium fuel after just minor modifications to a conventional reactor. Today MOX fuel provides close to 10 percent of France's nuclear power generation and is also used in Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.

The downside is that spent MOX fuel is even tougher to transport, store, and reprocess than regular used fuel. Spent MOX fuel contains four to five times as much plutonium, increasing the risk of unexpected nuclear chain reactions, called accidental criticalities, within reprocessing plants. Spent MOX is also three times as hot as spent uranium fuel, thanks to an accumulation of transuranic isotopes such as americium and curium, making it less fit for underground storage.

Therefore, according to a 2000 consensus report on reprocessing prepared for France's prime minister, spent MOX must cool for 150 years before it can go into an underground waste repository such as Yucca Mountain [see sidebar: "The Prickly Economics of Reprocessing"]. Meanwhile, spent MOX fuel is ­piling up quickly in La Hague's cooling ponds: the 543‑­metric‑ton accumulation grows by 100 metric tons every year.

The bottom line is that burning MOX fuel makes economic sense only as the beginning of a larger process that ends with incineration in a breeder reactor, and no sense at all as an end in itself. Most of France's reprocessing customers, seeing little future for nuclear energy amid the antinuclear demonstrations of the 1980s and 1990s, accordingly saw no future for breeders either. In that context, Bertel says, pulling away from reprocessing and MOX fuel made perfect sense. As she puts it, "If you are stuck with the spent MOX fuel, why bother?"

The French government and EDF remain invested in the country's nuclear future and therefore classify La Hague's spent MOX as a strategic reserve of plutonium to jump-start future breeder reactors. This eternal hope is, in fact, an essential justification for France's fuel cycle. Japan shares France's vision and built its own reprocessing plant using Areva's designs, which started up last year; the plant is expected to eventually supply Japanese reactors with MOX fuel.

France and Japan suddenly look less isolated in their reprocessing strategy, thanks to U.S. President George W. Bush. Early last year, Bush singled out France's nuclear program for a rare bit of cross-Atlantic praise, telling the American people in a Saturday radio chat that reprocessing will "allow us to produce more energy, while dramatically reducing the amount of nuclear waste." Surprisingly, Bush has endorsed reprocessing as not only a means of handling domestic nuclear waste but as a bold response to proliferation as well.

Turning a conventional argument on its head, Bush is saying that the risk of additional countries' using reprocessing to arm nuclear weapons can be lower, not greater, if the United States reprocesses. Under his proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), nations with "secure, advanced nuclear capabilities" would guarantee a steady supply of nuclear fuel to non-nuclear-weapons countries that agree to return the resulting spent fuel and the plutonium within for reprocessing, forgoing reprocessing plants of their own.

But many proliferation experts worry that Bush's plan could backfire. It's not clear that many countries will agree to forgo reprocessing, letting others do the work for them, while they themselves agree to take back the noxious wastes. If participation in GNEP is disappointing, the program could end up encouraging rather than impeding the spread of reprocessing technology—Areva, for one, is plainly interested in licensing its technology.

Whether or not GNEP attracts any takers, a movement toward reprocessing is already well established in the United States. U.S. utilities are getting their first taste of MOX fuel today, thanks to former President Bill Clinton, whose Energy Department in 1997 authorized the fabrication of surplus weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel for use in U.S. power plants. Clinton's DOE also awarded a contract to an Areva-led consortium to build a MOX fabrication plant at the DOE's Savannah River, S.C., site. While awaiting construction of the MOX plant—beset by lawsuits that have delayed its projected start date from 2009 to as late as 2015—Bush's first energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, gave Areva permission to produce a first load of MOX at Marcoule. The resulting fuel assemblies began producing power at Duke Power's Catawba, S.C., plant last year. (Abraham, by the way, has since signed on as chairman of Areva's U.S. subsidiary, Areva Enterprises.)

Since Bush's high-profile endorsement of reprocessing last year, nuclear players within and around the Energy Department have been lobbying Congress to support the next step toward full integration of plutonium into the U.S. nuclear industry: a ­reprocessing demonstration plant. The demo is needed to prove, at large scale, a reprocessing scheme called Urex+, developed at Argonne National Laboratory to be more proliferation-resistant than La Hague's. Urex+ coextracts plutonium together with other transuranic elements present in spent fuel. Such isotopes can be "burned" in a breeder reactor but would complicate the job of any would-be bomb maker, because they contaminate the explosive material somewhat.

The DOE's Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling Program Plan, sent to Congress this past May, also calls for a demonstration of a breeder reactor fueled by Urex+. In fact, as with France's fuel cycle, the DOE plan is hard to defend unless several such breeder reactors are built. Without them, high-level transuranic waste would become a growing annoyance in the United States, much like the MOX bundles building up in La Hague's cooling ponds. Burton Richter, a Nobel laureate who leads the DOE's science panel on nuclear waste separations (and also serves on the board of Areva Enterprises), acknowledges that breeder reactors are DOE's endgame. "Everybody is in agreement that the right system ultimately results in multiple recycles in fast [breeder] ­reactors, so that's where things are going," Richter says.

With visions of nuclear electricity "too cheap to meter" long gone, the case for breeder reactors has shifted from creation of new fuels to management of spent fuels. Without breeder reactors, the case for reprocessing is less than compelling. Considered in isolation, the economic arguments for and against reprocessing are a wash. Most of the arguments concerning security and terrorism, too, seem moot. But until or unless breeder reactors are commercialized that can truly burn up all the residual fissile material found in spent fuels, reprocessing will simply concentrate high-level waste in a form that's hotter and harder to handle, exchanging one nuclear waste headache for another.

About the Author

Contributing Editor Peter Fairley has reported for IEEE Spectrum from Bolivia, Beijing, and Paris.

To Probe Further

A recent report to address recycling of nuclear fuels, critically, is "Managing Spent Fuels in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing," by Frank von Hippel. It is also available online at http://www.fissilematerials.org. "Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option," a report to France's Prime Minister on the economics of reprocessing, was published in July 2000: http://fire.pppl.gov/eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf.

MIT's 2003 study, "The Future of Nuclear Power," is at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower.

Greenpeace France's "Stop Plutonium" Web site is http://www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en.

The U.S. Department of Energy sent a Recycling Program Plan to Congress in May 2006: http://www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/snfRecyclingProgramPlanMay2006.pdf .

Areva's La Hague Web site is http://www.cogemalahague.com.

Sidebar 1

The Terrorist Threat

IMAGE: Areva

A police-escorted truck carries pure plutonium from La Hague to Marcoule.

Heightened concerns about terrorism after 9/11 have complicated the global debate over French-style reprocessing. The de facto U.S. practice of leaving spent fuel in ponds adjacent to reactors—a tempting target for terrorists—suddenly seems more questionable than ever. But pure plutonium extracted at plants such as La Hague also could be material for dirty bombs, or even an actual atomic bomb. If a country with sophisticated facilities somehow got its hands on it, just 10 kilograms might suffice for a fission bomb.

The image of French reprocessing took a hit on 19 February 2003, when Greenpeace found a dramatic means of spotlighting the vulnerability of the supposedly top-secret plutonium ­shipments between La Hague and Areva's mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel plant at Marcoule: it intercepted a convoy carrying more than 138 kg of ­plutonium in the center of Chalon-sur-Saône, a small city in Burgundy, and invited the French media along for the show.

Sitting in Greenpeace's storefront bureau in Cherbourg, the regional capital 20 kilometers south of the La Hague plant, Greenpeace's Yannick Rousselet recounts the disquieting ease of the operation. "We just waited in front of La Hague, and within three or four weeks we knew everything," he says. By process of elimination, Rousselet's team identified the nondescript flatbed trailers carrying plutonium casks out of La Hague week after week. The trucks pulled out with their police escort at the same time and followed a consistent route and schedule. Stopping the convoy was hardly mission impossible: the convoy rolled into town right on time; a Greenpeace activist driving ahead slowed to a stop, and 25 more activists leaped from a van blocking the opposite lane to chain themselves to the flatbed truck. Rousselet says the stunned gendarmes chaperoning the shipment stepped out of their cars, popped their trunks, and quietly retrieved their weapons and armored jackets.

Greenpeace hired a London-based nuclear risk analysis consultancy, Large & Associates, to put a finer point on the demonstration by assessing a series of terrorism and accident scenarios. In the worst case the consultants studied, an armed group immobilizes a plutonium convoy in a highway tunnel just south of Paris with fuel tanker trucks, opens the plutonium canisters, and then ignites the tanker fuel. In the consultant's estimation, the resulting fire and a northerly breeze would send a plutonium plume over Paris, causing a death toll as high as 4700 and necessitating the permanent relocation of much of the French capital.

Greenpeace's maneuver made good television; however, Areva defends the safety of its shipments. It says the convoys are protected by sophisticated, secret defense systems, which remained silent for Greenpeace, because the French security forces can "differentiate between a pacifist operation and a terrorist attack." —P.F.

 

Sidebar 2

The Prickly Economics of Reprocessing

IMAGE: Frederic Pitchal/Sygma/Corbis

A nuclear fuel canister at La Hague: the blades facilitate air cooling of the material.

Critics of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United States often cite its cost, hoping to offer a clean economic argument unsullied by complex issues about national security, arms control, and the ­environment. But comparing alternative nuclear-fuel-cycle costs is a slippery business, requiring firm long-term projections of uranium prices, estimated total costs of waste disposal procedures that have not actually been implemented yet, and a credible way of factoring in R&D expenditures covered by the military.


In the 1970s, uranium prices were expected to go through the roof within a few decades. But that argument fell into disfavor during the last two decades of the 20th century, when nuclear construction came to a standstill worldwide. Now, with expectations of a nuclear renaissance, uranium prices have increased by a factor of more than four since 2003. Today's economists tend to discount alarmist uranium supply scenarios. Known resources are dependent on the intensity of exploration, and uranium exploration has, until recently, been meager. What's more, because uranium fuel is but a small part of total nuclear generating costs, the industry could afford to pay higher extraction costs without pricing itself out of business.


Mainly for those reasons, an influential 2003 report on the future of nuclear power, done at MIT, concluded that possible ­depletion of fuel resources "is not a pressing reason for proceeding to reprocessing and breeding for many years to come."


But if economics does not vindicate reprocessing, neither does it damn it. Although credible studies have concluded that reprocessing and producing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel is several times more costly than using fresh uranium fuel, the cost penalty is small when viewed in context. In addition, studies pricing MOX fuel often underplay the ­significant uncertainties inherent in their calculations. The biggest is the ultimate cost of waste disposal, because no country is ­actually operating a final repository. As the MIT study warns, "the uncertainty in any estimate of fuel cycle costs is extremely large."


Benjamin Dessus, director of the Ecotech program at France's prestigious National Center for Scientific Research, says that he has concluded economics will never settle the reprocessing debate. Eight years ago, Dessus coauthored a high-profile report on the economics of reprocessing for France's then prime minister, Lionel Jospin. It concluded that phasing out reprocessing would cut France's power costs by 1.3 ­percent—an answer that pleased neither side in the debate.


"[Jospin] requested a report on economics, and we returned a report that said economics couldn't decide it," Dessus says. "He didn't want to hear that." —P.F.

 

Military not ready for other wars

Troops in US lack resources, government says

By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post  |  March 20, 2007

WASHINGTON -- Four years after the invasion of Iraq, the high and growing demand for US troops there and in Afghanistan has left ground forces in the United States short of the training, personnel, and equipment that would be vital to fight a major ground conflict elsewhere, senior US military and government officials acknowledge.

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More troubling, the officials say, is that it will take years for the Army and Marine Corps to recover from what some officials privately have called a "death spiral," in which the ever-more-rapid pace of war-zone rotations has consumed 40 percent of their total gear, wearied troops, and left no time to train to fight anything other than the insurgencies now at hand.

The risk to the nation is serious and deepening, senior officers warn, because the US military now lacks a large strategic reserve of ground troops ready to respond quickly and decisively to potential foreign crises, whether the internal collapse of Pakistan, a conflict with Iran, or an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. Air and naval power can only go so far in compensating for infantry, artillery, and other land forces, they said. An immediate concern is that critical Army overseas equipment stocks for use in another conflict have been depleted by the recent troop increases in Iraq, they said.

"We have a strategy right now that is outstripping the means to execute it," General Peter Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.

The Army's vice chief of staff, General Richard Cody, described as "stark" the level of readiness of Army units in the United States, which would be called on if another war breaks out. "The readiness continues to decline of our next-to-deploy forces," Cody told the House Armed Services Committee's readiness panel last week. "And those forces, by the way, are . . .also your strategic reserve."

General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked last month by a House panel whether he was comfortable with the preparedness of Army units in the United States. He stated simply: "No . . . I am not comfortable."

"You take a lap around the globe -- you could start any place: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela, Colombia, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, North Korea, back around to Pakistan, and I probably missed a few. There's no dearth of challenges out there for our armed forces," Pace warned in his testimony. He said the nation faces increased risk because of shortfalls in troops, equipment and training.

Pace said the unexpected demand for more troops in Iraq -- from the 10 brigades that commanders projected last year they would need by the end of 2006, to the 20 brigades scheduled to be there by June -- prompted him to recommend permanently adding 92,000 troops to the Army and Marine Corps, saying it would "make a large difference in our ability to be prepared for unforeseen contingencies."

Indeed, the recent increase of more than 32,000 US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan has pushed already severe readiness problems to what some officials and lawmakers consider a crisis point. Schoomaker said last week that sustaining the troop increase in Iraq beyond August would be "a challenge." The Marines' commandant, General James Conway, expressed concern to defense reporters last week that it would bring the Marine Corps "right on the margin" of breaking the minimum time at home for Marines between combat tours. US commanders in Iraq say they may need to keep troop levels elevated into early 2008.

The troop increase has also created an acute shortfall in the Army's equipment stored overseas -- known as "prepositioned stock" -- which would be critical to outfit US combat forces quickly should another conflict erupt, officials said.

The Army should have five full combat brigades' worth of such equipment: two stocks in Kuwait, one in South Korea, and two aboard ships in Guam and at the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. But the Army had to empty the afloat stocks to support the troop increase in Iraq, and the Kuwait stocks are being used as units rotate in and out of the country. Only the South Korea stock is close to complete, according to military and government officials.

"Without the prepositioned stocks, we would not have been able to meet the surge requirement," Schoomaker said. "It will take us two years to rebuild those stocks. That's part of my concern about our strategic depth."

"The status of our Army prepositioned stock . . . is bothersome," Cody said last week.

Democratic and Republican lawmakers who received classified briefings last week on the stocks and overall Army readiness voiced alarm.

"I'm deeply concerned," said Representative Ike Skelton, Democrat of Missouri and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who last week asked the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office to investigate the stocks "as a matter of vital importance to national defense."

Representative Solomon Ortiz, Democrat of Texas and chairman of the committee's readiness panel, said: "I have seen the classified-only readiness reports. And based on those reports, I believe that we as a nation are at risk of major failure, should our Army be called to deploy to an emerging threat."

El Baradei interview on Iran

FT interview: Mohamed ElBaradei

By Daniel Dombey

Published: February 19 2007 21:12 | Last updated: February 19 2007 21:12

On Monday, the Financial Times talked to Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency ahead of a crucial week in the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme.

A UN Security Council resolution passed last December calls on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment – which can produce both nuclear fuel and weapons grade material – by Wednesday February 21, the date that Mr ElBaradei is due to produce a report on Terhan's compliance with the Security Council's demands.

On Tuesday he is scheduled to meet Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. Barring a last minute breakthrough, the dispute will then return to the UN, where the US will push for additional sanctions.

In his 40-minute interview with the FT, Mr ElBaradei made clear his doubts both about calls for more sanctions and the international community's emphasis on suspending enrichment. He says that it is far more important to dissuade Iran from pursuing enrichment on an industrial scale – a development that could be a mere six months away – since the country has already acquired considerable technical knowledge from enriching uranium in a "research and development" facility.

This is a transcript of his conversation with the FT.

The importance of negotiations:

FT: What hopes do you have that the Iran nuclear dispute will be resolved in a reasonable time period?

ElBaradei: I'm still quite hopeful because I don't see any other option, quite frankly. How long will it take to convince all the parties to go back to the negotiating table is a matter of speculation. I know however for sure that even if you go for a year or two for retaliation and counter-retaliation and more sanctions it will get worse for everybody, Iran of course, but also all other parts of the international community, specifically, in the Middle East which simply cannot afford an additional escalation which would lead to militancy and increase terrorism. So if we can avoid going through this painful process, knowing that it can never resolve the issue, and try to resolve the process going back to negotiation, that's obviously in the interest of everybody. Both sides understand that. Both sides understand that there's no other way except than to go to negotiation. It's just a question of how to get both sides to the negotiating table while saving face. It really is about saving face…

There's a lot of efforts by everybody trying to do that right now, a lot of it is really, more [of a] drafting process, more how to present a package in a balanced way and whereby the Iranians would feel that they have not lost face and the international community would feel that their requirements had been satisfied. I came up with this idea of double, simultaneous suspension, a time out.

FT: Which would be simultaneous rather than sequential?

ElBaradei: Correct, and that would require some sort of road map to agree on that, or a timeline if you like, that Iran will take a time out from its enrichment activities as a confidence building measure. That obviously does not impact on its right because nobody is questioning its right and this is a concern of Iran that this might compromise the right. I don't think anybody is questioning the right, it's about timing and modalities of implementing fully this right in light of the confidence deficit created. And the Security Council made clear that if Iran does suspend they are ready to suspend [sanctions].

FT: Although that was sequential, wasn't it?

ElBaradei: Yes, but really, you can say sequential a day after, it doesn't really matter if you agree in advance how this will happen, it can be simultaneous. It can even be the same day, somebody will look at it as sequential, others can look at it as simultaneous.

As I said, it is not a major hurdle to get over that, because the stakes are just too high right now in my view to go towards a confrontation route. Sanctions were all right because the international community wanted to send a message that we are concerned and they did that, but… everybody knows that sanctions are not going to resolve the issue in and of itself.

Iran's failure to comply with UN demands

FT: People expect on Wednesday you will report that Iran has not suspended because there's no sign that Iran has suspended. That's the clear expectation.

ElBaradei: Yes.

FT: So after your report there will obviously more pressure from the US to push for more sanctions. Do you think that it will be ill advised to push for more sanctions at the Security Council straight away?

ElBaradei: Obviously, short of a major change of heart, I would report that Iran has not complied with the demand of the international community to suspend. I'm going to see Mr Larijani tomorrow, who's coming to see me in Vienna. And I will continue to make a last ditch effort to try to convince them that it is in their interest to find a way to go into negotiations. If it doesn't happen and I don't see that it is going to happen overnight, I will have to report negatively.

The Security Council resolution, the previous one, 1737 [agreed in December], indicated that if Iran did not comply they will take additional measures. It's a policy judgment, I do not want to replace myself for the Security Council's judgment, but I know for sure that even with additional sanctions, if they were to go for additional sanctions, they would still, in parallel, look for ways to get Iran to the negotiating table and in compliance with the concern of the international community that the programme is not a peaceful programme. Really the whole thing is about confidence building.

Sanctions

FT: You have have real concerns about sanctions. If they begin to bite do you think they are counter productive?

ElBaradei: I have major concerns about relying on sanctions alone. Our experience without exception is that sanctions alone do not work and in most cases radicalise the regime and hurt the people who are not supposed to be hurt. So I have a major concern not about sanctions per se but sanctions alone. And sanctions have to be coupled at all time with incentives and a real search for a compromise based on face saving, based on respect.

I mean we always forget this word respect. A lot of the problems we face, fifty per cent at least if not more, is psychological. Substance is important, but fifty per cent of it is how you approach it, how you reach out to people, how you understand where they're coming from. So I will continue to say: 'Yes, it is your prerogative to apply sanctions but sanctions alone will not do it and you need to invest as much in trying to find a solution through negotiation.'"

The tensions between Iran and the US

FT: Do you think both sides have invested inadequately in negotiations?

ElBaradei: I think so. I've been on the record for saying for many years that the Iranian issue will only be resolved when the US takes a decision to engage Iran directly… The nuclear issue is the tip of the iceberg, it masks a lot of grievances, security grievances, competition for power in the Middle East, economic issues, sanctions, it has to do with human rights, support for extremist groups, there are a lot of other issues that need to be resolved. Iran could be very helpful as a stabilising force in the Middle East. The US could be very helpful in providing the security assurances that obviously lie at the heart of some of the Iranian activities.

Iran's mastering of nuclear technology and the next steps

ElBaradei: Even if the Iranian programme is for peaceful purposes there is no question that at the back of their minds this is a deterrent, that it has a deterrence value as it were. So we need to understand that. I look at things also from the global security perspective. My worry primarily is that if Iran were to be pushed out of the regime, then we have another repeat of North Korea. My worry primarily [is about] if Iran were to start chipping away at an inspection authority or ability to do any inspection. And I start to worry [about] if Iran were to develop industrial capability before we at least clarify all these outstanding issues about the history and the nature of the programme.

These are the three important issues for me from a non-proliferation point of view, much more important for me than Iran acquiring the knowledge [of how to enrich uranium]. Because even if that was relevant six months ago it is not relevant today because Iran has been running these centrifuges for at least six months.

Yes, they might acquire a little bit more, perfecting the knowledge, but to aim at denying a country knowledge is almost impossible, to say the least. And there's a big difference between acquiring the knowledge for enrichment and developing a bomb. It is almost impossible for a country to, particularly because this right is quoted under the NPT [nuclear non-proliferation treaty], and the difference between acquiring knowledge and having a bomb is at least five to ten years away. And that's why I said the intelligence, the British, intelligence, the American intelligence, is saying that Iran is still years, five to ten years away from developing a weapon.

We need, what is really important is to have, a proper diagnosis of the problem, assess the problem properly. My concern is that there has been a lot of hype about the Iranian issue because you need to assess it properly and then you need to address it properly, afterwards.

Military action

ElBaradei: What you see right now, all this talk about the use of force, it's not only counter productive but in fact does not in any way help resolve the issue. Imagine what a regime would feel if they hear that force will be used against them, in additional to being called names, in addition to talk about regime change in the past. Even if they were not going to develop a nuclear weapon today, this would be a sure recipe for them to go down that route.

FT: And how worried are you that the US or Israel might carry out military action, an air strike?

ElBaradei: I of course cannot give hundred per cent guarantees that this will not happen because you read about this all the time. I don't know whether it is hype or if there is some kernel of truth to it.

I know for sure that this would be catastrophic, counterproductive, whatever you called it because for a variety of reasons.

One, I know that what we see in Iran right now is not the industrial capacity you can [use to develop a] bomb. You have small R&D at the knowledge level… to enrich uranium. And I said a hundred times you cannot bomb knowledge.

So there is not really much to bomb. And if you [do] then [you] turn the Iranian drive or you put it in high gear for developing a nuclear weapon. We know that if you jolt a country's pride, all the factions, right, left and centre will get together and try to accelerate a programme to develop a nuclear weapon to defend themselves.

That's classic strategic thinking in any country, whether it's a democracy, a theocracy, whatever… There is a fundamental choice people need to make, which is either you understand that there is a limit to military power, that these issues mask a sense of insecurity or even competition for dominance or influence but force is not the appropriate means to address these issues. Or [you] go for the military option and then either you'll have a repeat of North Korea or you have a repeat of Iraq and these are not our greatest achievements as civilised human beings.

Iran's current nuclear capacity

FT: You talk about them having a small R&D programme. There's a certain amount of cloudiness about where they are. We know that they have two 164 centrifuge cascades above ground in the "R&D" facility at Natanz. They have also said but sometimes denied that they have two further 164 centrifuge cascades below ground in in Natanz. Is that where they are at the moment?

ElBaradei: I think that's where they are at the moment. I think they probably even have one, I'm not sure they've even installed the second one, so it is still just one, so it is still small scale,so whatever they have, what we have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that would enable them to make bombs.

FT: So have the two [cascades of centrifuges] above ground been functioning smoothly at all?

ElBaradei: They have been functioning, I think they have been functioning, they have been able to run them simultaneously, and that also shows as I said that they acquire the knowledge.

The UN demands for suspension of uranium enrichment

ElBaradei: The idea… to continue to focus only on the suspension in my view is not the right approach. You can focus on suspension because it is a confidence building measure but… if I look at it from a weapons perspective there are much more important issues to me than the suspension of this.

The ideal situation is to make sure that there is no industrial capacity, that there is full inspection, because you are asking me how much do they have underground, well I can tell you, but we are not implementing the Additional Protocol [of the NPT], so I don't have spot checks and I do not have the confidence I would have with the Additional Protocol.

FT: When did the inspectors last visit?

ElBaradei: It was last week [when] we were there. I mean the inspection is going smoothly insofar as that I think. It gives us additional authority, it's not just the spot checks. I mean spot checks are not that important, I mean frankly you go after a week, you see what's happened. But what happens is that it gives us [more insight into] R&D. For example [under the additional protocol, currently not applied by Iran, we have] authority to see manufacturing of equipment, which for now we are not able to see. Are they manufacturing more equipment to install later on, that we are not able to see at the moment.

Top priorities

ElBaradei: My three priorities as I said are [for] Iran not to go to industrial capacity until the issues are settled, confidence is built, we need full inspection, involving additional protocol, and at all costs I would like to see Iran not moving out of the [treaty based non-proliferation] system. That would set a terrible precedent and I do not want them to come back in a couple of years and say: 'Good morning gentlemen, we have nuclear weapons.'

The prospects of Iran achieving industrial scale enrichment.

FT: If you define industrial capacity as a cascade of 3,000 centrifuges or more, since if that was fully functioning it would take a year to get enough fissile material for a bomb, how far away do you think they are at the current stage of progress?

ElBaradei: I think they are still far away

FT: A year, two years?

ElBaradei: It's difficult, I really like not to take numbers, to speculate, but away from what, from developing the three thousand [centrifuges]?

FT: From getting three thousand functioning smoothly.

ElBaradei: I don't know, it could be a year, it could be six months. It could be a year, but we need to remember but as long as even they have 3,000 [centrifuges], as long as these 3,000 are under [NPT] safeguards, they cannot go beyond five per cent, people forget that… it's really a risk assessment more of tomorrow more than it is of today…

The choices ahead

ElBaradei: I don't judge intention. It's very difficult to judge. And you know it very much on which kind of environment you create in the region. If you create an environment in which Iran feels isolated, in which Iran is subject to further sanctions, then some of these worst case scenarios could take place, because then you would put the hard liners in the driver's seat, you would make the country feel more and more insecure and then some of these scenarios could happen.

If there is another narrative, based on engagement, based on dialogue, based on reconciling differences, based on stabilising Iraq, stabilising Lebanon, opening up a trade agreement with the Iranians based on providing [them] with nuclear technology, western technology, as the six party offer [tabled last year by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana on behalf of the UK, France, Germany, the US, China and Russia] promises, then this progression could be quite different, because first of all Iran would not necessarily fear that they would be attacked.

FT So the US needs to give security guarantees?

ElBaradei: Oh yes, absolutely, then we should also stop calling names and threaten regime change. And of course if we give them all the technology they need then of course it's costly anyway [to pursue their own uranium enrichment], even if they wanted to. However, we need to explore all these options…

Iran sees enrichment.. sooner or later as a strategic goal because they feel that this will bring them power, prestige and influence. They feel that this will bring them into the company of some of the large and influential [states], the 12, 13 countries with enrichment processing, even if they don't have a weapon, and to change that perception you need to then to look into the whole regional and global security position, because unfortunately a lot of that is true. A nuclear capability is a nuclear deterrent in many ways…

When you see here in the UK the programme for modernising Trident, which basically gets the UK far into the 21st century with a nuclear deterrent, it is difficult then for us to turn around and tell everybody else that nuclear deterrents are really no good for you, it does not increase your security, because all the weapon states, without exception, are either modernising, or thinking about developing new weapons not only for deterrence purpose, but actually usable [ones]. Statements have been made during the last couple of years about possible actual use, such as mini-nukes, bunker buster. So the environment is do as I say not do as I say and that is not sustainable.

What Iran needs to begin negotiations

FT: Your 'time out' idea is deliberately vague. Would it be enough for the Iranians to suspend enrichment activities since the resolution calls on them to do more?

ElBaradei: I think the resolution talks about if they suspend enrichment-related activities, [then] they will suspend sanctions. They ask them to do a host of other things, but suspension of sanctions is linked to the enrichment. And yes, there is a part of constructive ambiguity because I would like to leave people room for manoeuvre to negotiate the details.

I cannot replace myself for governments, it is governments to negotiate the details, but it is encouraging that I have not seen anyone so far reject the idea. Everyone so far is saying we like this but we want to add this or that or the other. I still think it's very much an idea that's alive and kicking. President Putin recently came in support of it, the Germans, the French said that this mutual suspension is a good idea. The Americans also did not reject it so far although they said that the Security Council resolution is clear. That's fine, but somebody needs to take it and translate it into a working solution.

FT: Have you seen any solid or substantial response from the Iranians? I know that they didn't make a big noise on Revolution Day [which Iran celebrates on11 February].

ElBaradei: That was frankly quite positive, because all the expectations were that they were going to announce that they were going to go for the 3,000 centrifuges and maybe some other stuff.

They did not do that and I think the president [Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad] said he would make that announcement in April. That to me is an effort to reach out. It's a moderate reaction, frankly. So we still have this window of opportunity, but the window of opportunity is frankly until our board meets.

Even if my report is coming out this week, I can still add and reverse judgements there until the 6th of March. So we have a window that is not very long, but still I would still like to see something happening before the board because once I go to the board then you go into this sort of autopilot process, the board would react, the Security Council would react, it then makes things much more difficult.

The US

FT: How constructive has the US been?

ElBaradei: The US has been helpful in joining the six party offer. That took a lot of time and was a step in the right direction. I still hope that eventually the IS will be able to get into direct contact with Iran about the regional issues and not only the nuclear issue because they are very much linked, the connection between the regional issue and the nuclear issue are very much linked because they are all about security, we should not delude ourselves about that.

The US building up of military force in the Gulf, I think it's not only [because of] the nuclear issue, it's.. Iraq, it's… Afghanistan, Gulf protection, we have seen that over time, people flexing muscles, and the Iranians have been making parades.

But flexing muscles and showing how much force you have, it's part of the game, but… the issues at hand are not going to be resolved by shows of force and frankly a lot of issues we are facing in the Middle East today are absolutely immune to any resolution through the use of force…

I am all for dialogue, as I am all from negotiation, not because this is a soft approach, but I know if you engage people you moderate their behaviour. If you isolate them you radicalise them. That's why I always say if you have a problem sit and talk it over but if you continue to think that dialogue is the icing on the cake and I will only do it if people are behaving well you might have to wait for very long.

North Korea

FT: Some people see the agreement on North Korea as a re-enactment of the Agreed Framework [the 1994 nuclear deal between the US and Pyongyang] but this time North Korea had nuclear weapons. So was it a mistake for the US to walk away?

ElBaradei: I leave it to the US government and the public to judge that. People refer to this agreement as the son of the Agreed Framework. Hopeful, it's a legitimate son, hopefully it will allow us to go forward. I have a lot on my plate for me now, while I'm still doing this job, to reminisce and say what we have done wrong.

We have done a lot of things wrong on this and many issues but the important thing is to focus on the future. I think this is a step in the right direction. It is not the ideal solution. Korea should not have had nuclear weapons. We have mismanaged nuclear North Korea to the point where they have a nuclear weapon so that's why I say we do not want a repeat of it in Iran…

And it is not ideal because we are going to deal [with] inspection in an incremental way, but the world is not black and white, as long as we are talking and not bombing each other, I think that is positive.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

--
Siddharth Varadarajan
Associate Editor
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US seeking favorable development of Korean nuclear issue

 
US seeking favorable development of Korean nuclear issue
    People's Daily    
Oct 30, 2006

The nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a shift from secrecy to openness for the country on its possession of nuclear arms. Superficially, the nuclear test is of some concern to the United States, but it is quite possible that the United States may be the biggest beneficiary of the DPRK test.

Nuclear non-proliferation is not the US' goal

In the US national security strategy, the prevention of nuclear proliferation is simply a way to ensure national security. The US is not absolutely against nuclear proliferation; its possession of nuclear weapons is proof of this. It benefits from international cooperation in developing its own nuclear weapons. Sharing its nuclear knowledge is a form of proliferation. The Manhattan Project, for instance, was a joint nuclear research program between the US, Britain and Canada and the atomic bomb was partially built with the help of these wartime allies. Britain continued to research nuclear weapons and Canada did not. The United States' missile defense project with Japan is another such project to share nuclear knowledge. This is nuclear knowledge proliferation; the key is with whom it is shared.

The United States has no lingering points of contention with Britain and France over the development of their nuclear program, because it believes that western democratic countries, even with nuclear weapons, pose no danger to US security. The US has also accepted the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons, though Israel has refused to confirm or deny this. If Israel does in fact have nuclear weapons, this will presumably be a deterrence to attack from other countries in the region. This would be a boon for the US too as political and military pressures could be shared, increasing the security of the United States.

After the eastern democratic nation of India tested nuclear weapons, the US quickly realized that imposing sanctions was not the best direction to take. It chose instead to find ways to encourage India to be a responsible nuclear power and to help India develop into one of the economic superpowers of the 21st century. It even wanted to develop a civilian nuclear power program with India. This was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

India established a nuclear program not to defend against or attack the US, Russia, Britain, China, France or even Pakistan. India has three to seven times the amount of conventional weapons that Pakistan has. It is Pakistan that needs nuclear weapons. It is clear that the United States' deliberate violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was a move to contain other nations. US assistance to India is a kind of nuclear proliferation, vertical proliferation.

This clearly indicates that nuclear non-proliferation is not America's strategic objective. Its strategic goal is national security. The US helped India to help curb the rise of autocratic nations. As long as the US needs anti-terrorism support, the US will keep Pakistan on side as a non-NATO ally and give it billions of dollars of support. It no longer worries about the impact of a nuclear Pakistan on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will not concern itself with the legitimacy of the Pakistani government, or investigate the legal liabilities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani atomic bomb.

In America's eyes, nuclear proliferation is classified into the acceptable and the unacceptable. The former benefits US security, the latter does not. When US allies break or bend nuclear rules, they are not opposed. When its rivals have nuclear weapons, the US takes a pragmatic approach. When nations not allied to the US have nuclear arms, the US faces reality and gradually grows to value its relationship with those other countries, ultimately trying to incorporate them into its global strategy.

US seeks advantageous position in region

It is important to understanding the United States' long-term utilitarian attitude toward non-proliferation, which is quite different to China's staunch opposition to any form of nuclear proliferation. China needs to grasp the US's agenda in the DPRK following nuclear testing and predict the possible evolution of US policy on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States has had to register its objection to the DPRK's nuclear test to be politically correct. China perceives this as part of the US' overall strategy in the region. The US has been monitoring the DPRK"s nuclear development for a long time and suspected DPRK of having nuclear weapons as early as a decade ago. It was fully prepared for the DPRK to take this step, and may already be resigned to the DPRK becoming a nuclear power.

The United States abandoned talks with DPRK at the end of last year. The US imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK and found reasons for the DPRK to be excluded from Six-Party talks. In the meantime, it asked China to share the responsibility of a nuclear DPRK, despite the fact that DPRK claims it was pressure from the US that forced it to develop nuclear weapons. Considering the difficulty of the mission, the requests of the United States are bound to drive a wedge between China and North Korea. The Bush administration's sanctions have caused the DPRK to believe that talks with the US have become impossible. The US is remolding North Korea's foreign policy by taking positive measures to induce the DPRK to conduct nuclear tests, imposing sanctions under the multilateral framework of the UN and weakening China's influence on North Korea.

The United States is also making strategic use of Japan and South Korea in the Korean nuclear issue. In recent years, the relationship between the United States and South Korea has weakened. South Korea insists on its Sunshine Policy for North Korea. South Korean people are more and more dissatisfied about the United States over the issue. The DPRK nuclear test will isolate the two neighboring countries, which is beneficial the US.

The next president must adjust policy on DPRK

America is confident that North Korea would not forfeit its nuclear arms and knows that a war is not a political possibility. It has to resolve the issue peaceful means, but needs to ensure the DPRK becomes a responsible nuclear state. North Korea claims it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, that it will not sell or proliferate nuclear weapons or technology and that it is not involved in international terrorist activities.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 to impose sanctions on DPRK. As long as the DPRK guarantees its nuclear weapons are only for self-defense purpose, it will have no trouble with the US, at least until the next President of the United States is sworn in.

The US-led war in Iraq and the sanctions the Bush administration has imposed on the DPRK have affected North Korea's awareness of security; relations between the two countries have seriously deteriorated. Hopefully the next president of the United States will adjust its policy and hold talks with the DPRK.

North Korea has boosted its confidence in terms of security and will be more willing to interact with the US, as it is still being isolated by the broader international community. This is North Korea's position now but US will ultimately lift the sanctions it has imposed on the DPRK. The US will seek favorable development in the regional situation.

By People's Daily Online 

Containment with Chinese Characteristics

ontainment with Chinese Characteristics

Beijing Hedges against the Rise of India

By Christopher Griffin

Posted: Thursday, September 7, 2006

ASIAN OUTLOOK

AEI Online

Publication Date: September 7, 2006

This Asian Outlook is available here as an Adobe Acrobat PDF. Although China and India have announced that their relationship is important enough to "reshape the world,"[1] Beijing views its increasingly important ties with Delhi as a means to manage India's growing strength. China has combined traditional strategic balancing and diplomatic engagement in an effort to set its own terms for India's emergence as a great power. Without American support, India is at risk of being boxed in by Beijing's containment strategy. In an impressive display of whirlwind diplomacy, China and India have just negotiated a series of major agreements: a strategic partnership in May 2005, a memorandum on energy cooperation in January 2006, and a memorandum of understanding on military relations in May 2006. Chinese observers point to these agreements as proof that Beijing and Delhi refuse "to become sacrifices of contention between big powers" and that "neither of them has seen the growth of the other side as a threat but, instead, as a development opportunity for itself."[2] But all is not as it seems in Asia. Indeed, the more one follows Sino-Indian relations, the more it appears that Beijing has ripped a page from what it perceives as the U.S. playbook for containing a rising power. The People's Daily recently summarized U.S. policy toward China: There have been two tendencies in the United States in the formulation of its China policy, one holding China as a potential rival that must be contained on all sides; the other believing China's momentum is irreversible. . . . [It must therefore] be engaged to play a "responsible" and "constructive" role. Washington's China policy in recent years has turned out a combination of the two, while its [recent] acts are all-sided containments under the cloak of engagement words.[3] As frustrating as Beijing finds this perceived policy of "all-sided containments under the cloak of engagement," it has found the approach increasingly useful in its own relationship with India. Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai? The modern Sino-Indian relationship opened on an optimistic note that is difficult to recall today. When Beijing and Delhi established formal relations in 1950, each had recently finished bitter struggles for independence and then stood at the vanguard of a global post-colonial movement. The implications of this sea change in international affairs appeared so profound that Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru found it necessary to introduce a new concept to describe relations among nonaligned states: Panchsheel, widely known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Chinese government embraced the concept (which appears in both countries' diplomatic statements to this day), and the Sino-Indian relationship was celebrated as forming the nucleus of a new world order. Indeed, the Indian media were encouraged by Nehru's government to use the term "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai," or "India and China are brothers," to describe the relationship. Tensions simmered, however, beneath the smooth façade of Sino-Indian relations. The Panchsheel principles were just the introduction to a territorial settlement between Beijing and Delhi that did not resolve several major disputes, largely concerning the McMahon Line negotiated in 1914 to establish a border between British India, de facto independent Tibet, and the Republican Chinese government (which signed the agreement but did not ratify it). Nehru considered an important part of India's stature that the McMahon Line stand, while the Communist Chinese government considered it an effort to enjoy the gains of an imperial British land grab. Conflict broke out in October 1962, when the dispute over the Sino-Indian border in the area of Aksai Chin (near Kashmir and under Chinese control but claimed by India) and Arunachal Pradesh (east of Bhutan and under Indian control but claimed by China) erupted into warfare. After clearing the Indian Army from Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew and established a line of control along India's claimed border.[4] China achieved all its goals in this conflict, known as the Sino-Indian War. Possession of Aksai Chin secured a direct supply route between Tibet and Xinjiang, while Nehruvian delusions of grandeur lay safely in shambles--so much so that one scholar ventured that China's "strategy as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few thousand miles of mountainous territory . . . as to erode India's position as a power of some consequence on the Asian scene."[5] For the next two decades, China consolidated its 1962 victory against India by supporting strategic proxies against Indian interests, most notably in its support of Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars. Chinese policy was characterized by declarations to the effect that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistani government and people."[6] While the declarations of Chinese support could not save Pakistan from repeated humiliations in its fights with India, they drew lines that Delhi knew it could not cross in its fights with Islamabad without possibly triggering Chinese intervention. Meanwhile tensions along the border kept Indian forces diverted to the contested northern front, especially Arunachal Pradesh, a remote territory enveloped on three sides by foreign frontiers and dependent upon supplies delivered through the 21-kilometer-wide Siliguri Corridor. Also, beginning at some point in the 1980s, China initiated covert support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In the 1980s, however, Sino-Indian relations began to thaw as the leadership in Beijing sought to distance itself from both the Soviet and American Cold War camps, leading to the launch of an "omnidirectional" foreign policy in Asia. This modified approach toward the subcontinent was reflected in China's diminished verbal support for Pakistan during a near-outbreak of Indo-Pakistani hostilities over Kashmir, and likewise when the Chinese government gradually backed out of its support for Sri Lanka and Nepal during Indian disputes with those countries in 1987 and 1988.[7] Indeed, it appeared that Beijing was ready to recognize Indian ascendance in what it increasingly viewed as the strategic backwater of Southeast Asia.[8] Nuclear Breakout, Nuclear Deal China's new approach toward India ran into trouble after 1991, when a newly reformed Indian economy recovered from crisis and entered a period of rapid growth, allowing Delhi to climb the ranks of international arms importers quickly. While India's economic dynamism put pressure on the Sino-Indian relationship, the tipping point came on May 11, 1998, when the Indian government detonated three nuclear devices in the first of a series of tests conducted by Delhi and Islamabad that month. The tests revealed the suspicions that Beijing and Delhi continued to harbor. In an explanatory letter that then-Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sent to world leaders, he specifically referred to China ("an overt nuclear weapons state . . . which committed armed aggression against India in 1962") as a reason for the Indian bomb.[9] Senior Chinese statesman Qian Qichen responded that "international condemnation [of the tests] is totally justified" and pointed out that "[w]hat is particularly unacceptable is that India has gone so far as claiming that it conducted the nuclear tests because of China's threat."[10] The People's Liberation Army Daily added that the nuclear tests have "further exposed [India's] ambition of seeking regional hegemony in the military sphere."[11] While Qian condemned India's nuclear tests, the Chinese government used its presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to craft an international condemnation. UNSC Resolution 1172 called for India and Pakistan to scrap their nuclear weapons programs and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. The resolution was far harsher than a U.S.-drafted statement of the four other permanent members of the UNSC.[12] Despite its condemnation of India's nuclear weapons program, China declined to impose any sanctions on either India or Pakistan, still viewing the latter as a useful balancer on the subcontinent while Beijing entered into a period of diplomatic rapprochement with Delhi that concluded with Vajpayee's June 2003 state visit to Beijing. The likely explanation for China's Janus-faced handling of the 1998 South Asian nuclear breakout was that while it felt threatened by India's nuclear program, it also recognized that the tests had set the diplomatic ball rolling by pulling America into the region, a process that continued through the 1999 Kargil Crisis, the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, and the near-outbreak of war between India and Pakistan following a December 2001 attack against India's parliament. Although India and China trumpeted Vajpayee's 2003 visit to Beijing as proof of progress, the progress between the two countries was overtaken by a pair of bilateral agreements announced by India and the United States in the summer of 2005. The June 28 "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" overturned longstanding Chinese assumptions about India's regional power and its ties to Washington, and the July 18 Joint Statement pledged the United States to aid India's civil nuclear power program. China met the July 2005 nuclear deal with muddled hostility, as the Chinese government sought to criticize it without undercutting its newly improved relationship with India. On July 25, the foreign ministry stated that Beijing hoped "the relevant cooperation between [the United States] and India will be conducive to safeguarding the regional peace and stability in Asia."[13] The party mouthpiece the People's Daily meanwhile repeated criticism of the nuclear deal from American analysts, arguing that Washington viewed its relationship with India as a way to pressure China.[14] The Chinese government has been remarkably conciliatory toward the nuclear deal, signaling that it will not veto its approval in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), where its opposition could pose a major setback. The apparent logic behind China's moderation on the nuclear deal is Beijing's perception that any adverse strategic consequences of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation could be counteracted through similar support of Pakistan's civil nuclear program. A March 2006 People's Daily article indicated that Beijing retains the option of acting through strategic proxies[15] to undercut any gains that the United States and its allies make as a result of the nuclear deal: "The agreement will have its 'rippling' effect, which means that Pakistan, which has a similar position as India on the nuclear issue, may make similar demands and Iran may feel even more resentful of this 'double principle' in the current nuclear dispute."[16] Within a month of issuing this veiled threat, reports surfaced that Beijing had entered into talks with Islamabad on supplying a 2,000-megawatt nuclear power plant.[17] And China is in a strong position to press its case for cooperation with Pakistan--Beijing can make approval of its support for Pakistan a basic condition for supporting the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal at the NSG, a necessary step for Indian-American cooperation. China has thus set the stage for itself and its proxies to retain regional strategic ascendancy.[18] Ties that Bind: Military Contacts and the Contested Border While China is moving to contain the fallout from the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, it is also working to maintain its longstanding conventional military superiority over Indian forces, despite the latter's recent gains. The central elements of this effort have been a combination of bilateral agreements that will give Beijing better access to India's evolving military, and unilateral moves intended to strengthen its own position along the countries' contested border and in the Indian Ocean. Despite the global media focus on the nuclear deal in the summer of 2005, Beijing was far more concerned with a less-noted agreement signed between Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The June 28 "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" committed Washington and Delhi to cooperation in thirteen substantive areas such as joint operations, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer.[19] The New Framework is disconcerting to the Chinese government because it represents a major step forward in the development of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation that has accelerated since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The United States and India now organize regular exercises in which their militaries conduct sophisticated operations such as at-sea refueling, landing helicopters on ships at sea, and mixed force-on-force mock engagements. The lesson of this cooperative experience for the United States and India has been that while the latter seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy, it needs American support if it is to break away from its longstanding role as a client of Russian arms--a position that left it operating the same weapons as most of its neighbors, including China--and as a player on the wrong side of the growing technological gap between the American defense industrial base and the rest of the world.[20] Closer Indian ties to the United States defense establishment have tremendous implications for the military balance in Asia. They have first meant that the United States is moving closer to recognizing India as what the Bush administration calls a "responsible, democratic nation" that can be entrusted with responsibility for security in the Indian Ocean if U.S. forces are ever called to deploy rapidly to other theaters. And while the global superpower is inviting India to develop a dominant maritime position, Delhi's ever closer relationship with Washington will enhance its ability to do so. Indian leaders are keen to use the strategic partnership with the United States to introduce into India advanced U.S. technology, learn America's most successful operational practices, and give India the chance to integrate its widely dispersed military into an effectively unified force. Defense industrial ties with the United States promise to make this transformation sustainable over the long term as Delhi collaborates with Washington in the design and production of new generations of weapons systems.[21] Chinese observers have not let these developments pass without comment. On July 7, 2005, the People's Daily published an article titled "Washington Draws India in against China," in which it declared that the New Framework was "partly intended to diminish China's influence in this region and to safeguard and expand U.S. strategic interest [sic] in Asia."[22] The article continued by pointing out that the provisions for defense industrial cooperation are "of special significance given the fact that the United States on the one hand presses the European Union to keep [its] arms embargo on China and urges Israel to cancel arms sales to China while on the other hand sign[ing] a wide-ranging defense agreement with India." Despite China's rapidly developing defense industrial base, it cannot help but acknowledge its losses in being largely cut off from American, European, and Israeli markets, especially while India has access. The first component of China's response to these adverse developments has been to seek new routes to Delhi through political agreements that will permit greater Chinese observation of the Indian military. Most important is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that Mukherjee signed with Cao Gangchuan, China's minister of national defense, in May 2006. The MoU commits the two countries to a regimen of joint military exercises, collaboration in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and search-and-rescue efforts, as well as regular military exchanges.[23] Upon signing the MoU, Mukherjee drew the guarded conclusion that India's "ties with China have reached a certain degree of maturity. . . [We] are striving to address our differences in a proactive and purposeful manner without allowing them to affect the comprehensive development of our relationship."[24] Other Chinese assessments have been more sanguine, as characterized by the People's Daily commentary that the MoU will "foster a favorable international and regional situation, and provide a strategic foundation for mutual trust" with the opportunity for India to use the framework to "play a very important and positive role in maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region and across the world."[25] One Indian analyst pointed out the source of this divergence in views when he observed that the agreement appears to have three major implications for the Chinese side that Delhi does not share: One, China has taken the growing ties between India and the United States more seriously than it took the 1998 nuclear blasts by India. Two, the MoU is undoubtedly a Chinese initiative to seek a better understanding of the thinking within the Indian armed forces. And three, the MoU will not assist in a speedier resolution of the border dispute. . . China's only way of determining the progress of military relations between India and the U.S. is by having formal ties with the Indian defense ministry.[26] Seen in this light, it is not surprising that Beijing should be satisfied with the arrangement. And the American experience of military ties with China in the 1990s indicates that Delhi will find its new partnership a flawed one. The Sino-American relationship has been plagued by a lack of reciprocal transparency, as China sought to gain greater access to technical components of the U.S. military without raising the curtain on its own forces.[27] India may find China an eager partner at the negotiating table, but if it looks beneath China's "cloak of engagement words," it may yet find a pattern of containment. That pattern appears to be emerging first along the Sino-Indian border, where China is bolstering its military position by upgrading its infrastructure. This move is strategic because although China has always enjoyed a position with strong operational superiority over India along the contested areas in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, it is sensitive to the gradual deterioration of its position in the Indian Ocean as Delhi develops new generations of weapons systems with American support. The strategic consequences of India's growing naval power are clear. Every additional barrel of oil that China imports leaves Beijing more vulnerable to a disruption of the sea lanes. If Delhi's naval modernization effort turns the Indian Ocean into India's ocean, the risk for Beijing may grow unacceptable. In response, it appears that just as Beijing has long leveraged its claims against Indian-controlled territory in Arunachal Pradesh to legitimize its occupation of Aksai Chin, it may now leverage its superiority along the Sino-Indian border to remind Delhi of the costs of conflict on the Indian Ocean. The July 1 opening of a railway linking Beijing and Lhasa is the most important symbol of this Chinese strategy. This new link strengthens Beijing's grasp on Tibet: the number of ethnic Han Chinese arriving in Lhasa, where Chinese already outnumber Tibetans, has increased since the opening of the railway, and the PLA has also significantly enhanced its ability to deliver heavy weapons and logistical material to the region in the event of either a domestic disturbance or a conflict with India. Although one Chinese researcher has suggested that the "Indians' worries [are] unnecessary because a country's military strategy depends on its political intent," Beijing's position in Asia has benefited from reminding Delhi of China's superiority along the border.[28] China is also redressing the Indian Ocean balance directly through the "string of pearls" strategy. In recent years, Beijing has developed port facilities in Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sittwe, Burma (Myanmar); and Gwadar, Pakistan.[29] China has launched each of these developments through bilateral trade promotion agreements under which it pays most of the costs of dredging deep water ports, but it is also an element of a naval balancing strategy, as demonstrated by a Chinese-run radar station on Burma's Coco Islands and the development of naval facilities in the Gwadar ports. The potential drama surrounding these developments has not fully played out, but it is clear that despite recent bilateral summits in which the Chinese and Indian governments have exchanged pleasantries on cooperation to end border tensions, the dispute is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.[30] This will remain the case so long as China is able to bolster its strategic proxy Pakistan by strengthening its hold along the Indo-Tibetan border while developing a hedge against India's growing naval power.[31] The Race for Resources The aspect of Sino-Indian relations that has received the most attention in recent years is the simultaneous sprint for energy supplies. China and India each face a triple bind in the energy market: their rapid growth rates ( 9.1 percent and 6.1 percent annual GDP growth over the last decade, respectively) that fuel energy demand; their inefficient energy use that requires more additional energy input per percentage growth of GDP than more developed countries; and their dependence upon on foreign products to satisfy their energy demands (40 percent and 70 percent of crude oil consumption from imports, respectively).[32] Energy needs have driven China and India to a series of bidding wars for energy assets across the globe, experiences that have been especially sour for India. In a bid for Kazakhstan's third largest commercial oil producer in August 2005, China outbid India when Kazakh authorities allowed Beijing to make an additional offer after the final official bid.[33] Two months later, a Chinese oil firm beat out its Indian competitor when Beijing offered to back up the commercial bid with some $2 billion in development aid (Delhi had offered a paltry $200 million aid package).[34] And in December 2005, Burma decided to build a natural gas pipeline to Yunnan Province in China rather than across Bangladesh to India, reflecting a combination of Bangladeshi indecision on the terms of the deal and Rangoon's preference to foster trade with Beijing.[35] Although Beijing came out on top of all of the Sino-Indian gas and oil bidding wars, each fight nonetheless resulted in inflated prices for the assets that China eventually got, leading the two countries to consider joint bids for energy assets. The two sides tested the waters of cooperation in December 2004, when Chinese and Indian oil firms made a successful joint bid for a set of fields in Canada, setting the stage for a January 2006 "Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil and Natural Gas" that permits joint bids on energy assets in third countries.[36] Although it was an Indian initiative, the memorandum is a major victory for the Chinese government, as Delhi acquiesced to playing the role of "junior partner" in Beijing's globe-trotting campaign to secure energy resources. In addition to its symbolic significance, the new partnership means that as India and China enter into joint energy deals with third countries, they will develop common interests in the survival of what are--more often than not--unsavory regimes. Indeed, instead of creating a stable source of energy supplies, these deals are more likely to entangle India into disputes it might prefer to avoid. While the logic that India should concede to joining the opponents it cannot beat is compelling, it is also weakens Delhi's position vis-à-vis Beijing. Institutionalizing Chinese Leadership Since 2001, China has pursued an increasingly ambitious strategy of using regional forums to solidify its role as primus inter pares in Asia. This presents an even greater strategic challenge for India than energy arrangements. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the most important forum to Beijing's regional strategy. Founded under China's leadership in June 2001 as a means to coordinate cooperation among China, Russia, and the central Asian republics, the SCO was quickly marginalized by the success of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan later that year and the rapid development of security ties between Washington and several SCO members.[37] Despite this setback, the SCO has reemerged in recent years as a significant actor as American energies have been sapped by the war in Iraq. The statement adopted at the June 2005 SCO Astana Summit formally marked the organization's rebound as a Sino-centric bloc when the member states called for Washington to establish a timeline for withdrawal from central Asia, followed immediately by Uzbek president Islam Karimov's eviction of U.S. forces from the Karshi-Kanabad airbase in southern Uzbekistan. In the same month that SCO members delivered the Astana statement, the organization also welcomed India into the organization as an observer. Indian relations with the SCO have since been cool. While member states look at using the body as a nexus for collaboration on a wide range of political and security activities, Indian officials have repeatedly clarified that while "India is keenly interested in all activities focused on socio-economic development," it does not extend the range of cooperative fields beyond those.[38] The divide between Chinese and Indian views was on full display when Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh neglected to attend the June 2006 SCO summit in Shanghai, indicating in the words of one observer that "India was simply too important for a guest appearance, in contrast to Iran and Pakistan, which sent their presidents . . . [and] that India does not have the compulsions of a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad--in the doghouse internationally and desperate to say his piece on any available America-skeptic platform--or a Pervez Musharraf--a client of the Chinese leadership and looking to it to get some sort of parity with India in the Nuclear Supplier's Group."[39] While Singh's hands-off approach to the SCO may demonstrate a plausible strategy for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of membership in the organization, it comes up short in light of China's recent gains as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a body founded in 1985 that also includes Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. In contrast to the SCO invitation for Indian membership, the SAARC invitation to China was the result of a diplomatic debacle in which the regional politics played out as "India against the rest."[40] When Delhi tried to forestall the granting of observer status to China at the Dhaka Summit last year, Nepal (then receiving Chinese military assistance in the wake of an Indian arms embargo) made China's observership a condition for supporting Afghanistan's entry into the organization, a position that received broad support, especially from Pakistan.[41] The consequence of Delhi's capitulation is that India gained a seat in a Sino-centric, anti-American organization in exchange for giving China access to a body that is desperately looking for an additional player to challenge India's preeminence in South Asia. India's embarrassment in the SAARC membership process in 2005 will likely be a precursor to a permanent loss of influence in the organization. China's most ambitious project for regional leadership to date was its 2005 effort to transform the proposed East Asian Summit (EAS) into a Chinese-led outgrowth of the ASEAN+3 arrangement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members and Japan, China, and South Korea. Tokyo sought Australian and Indian participation in the meeting, a move that received support from Southeast Asia. When the Japanese proposal prevailed, Beijing quickly moved to invite Russian participation, an acknowledgement that if China could not lead the organization, it should be downgraded to serve as a regional "talk shop." The EAS experience is a perfect example of China's strategy of combining organizations (such as the SCO) that tie India down with those that leave it behind altogether. The latter component of China's strategy is most vividly displayed in the United Nations Security Council, in which Beijing uses its position as the sole permanent member state from Asia to guarantee that its regional competitors, Japan and India, are denied access.[42] It is possible that Security Council reform will be carried out--especially if the United States can avoid maneuvering itself into a position of de facto opposition to India's bid for membership--but only when China feels that the political consequences of unilaterally blocking progress are too risky. In sum, China has effectively engaged the regional organizations of Asia as useful bodies through which it can alternately bring India closer to the Sino-centric fold or minimize India's voice at more critical forums. The closest that India has come to posing a credible response has been with the support of Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States at a distance during the 2005 EAS debate. Caveats and Conclusions If China's recent behavior toward India can be best explained as a containment strategy designed to guarantee that India rises on China's terms, this conclusion should be qualified somewhat. The most important caveat is that it is not obvious that the Chinese government is acting with a unified strategy. It is possible that policy toward each of the areas discussed here is being crafted independently by separate divisions of the Chinese bureaucracy. We know, however, that in recent years, China's strategy toward India has moved up the policymaking food chain in Beijing.[43] Although a well-articulated "India strategy" may not have existed for much of China's recent history, it is inconceivable that most Chinese action today does not serve an increasingly well-defined set of goals, and it is difficult to ascertain a more likely one than that which this paper has suggested.[44] Americans should also recognize a divergence between China's economic and security interests with India; we have the same problem with Beijing. As trade between China and India grows, the relationship will develop the defining characteristic of the Sino-American relationship: tremendous gains from cooperative economic development are matched by growing stakes in bilateral disputes.[45] This trend neither foreordains nor forestalls strategic competition, but it will continue to complicate Sino-Indian relations. If China is pursuing a containment strategy against India, it has achieved some early key victories: guaranteeing that Pakistan will maintain rough nuclear parity on the subcontinent, co-opting Indian foreign policy interests through energy collaboration, and establishing a strong leadership position in regional political forums. For American policymakers, this trend suggests that despite noted atmospheric improvements in the Sino-Indian relationship, efforts to launch a new era of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai will ultimately falter on the longstanding disputes between the countries.[46] In contrast, Indian-American ties can benefit from India's long-term need for U.S. support if it is to effectively respond to China's containment policy. The various fields of Sino-Indian competition are multifaceted and intersect with American interests at many junctures. Therefore, there are countless opportunities for an American role. Washington should strive to: Drive as hard a bargain as possible at the NSG. Pakistan is not India: it has sold nuclear plans wholesale to such rogue states as Libya and North Korea and is perennially unstable. If Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation cannot be avoided, it should be on strictly safeguarded terms. Continue to support India's military modernization by lowering licensing restrictions on arms exports to Delhi. The purpose should not be to fuel a Sino-Indian arms race, but to dissuade China from pursuing a path of revanchism that will unite other Asian countries against it in collaboration with the United States. Maintain energy cooperation as a major plank of the U.S.-Indian relationship. India's efforts to secure energy resources through overseas acquisitions are inefficient, and history predicts that they will be ineffective. India could benefit most from cooperation to upgrade its energy processing and distribution infrastructure. Consider greater American participation in Asian regional forums. SAARC has already indicated that it would welcome Washington to an observer's seat, a move that would help balance Beijing's newfound influence with the body. A U.S.-led effort to reinvigorate a more inclusive body such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation would also provide an alternative to Chinese leadership in Asia. These policies could improve America's position in Asia and avoid some of the worst possible outcomes of Sino-Indian competition. As American policymakers debate Washington's proper role in shaping India's rise to great power status, they should keep in mind that Beijing has already chosen a leading role for itself. Christopher Griffin is a research associate at AEI. Intern Shivani Kota provided research assistance, and editorial assistant Evan Sparks worked with Mr. Griffin to edit and produce this Asian Outlook. Notes 1. John Lancaster, "India, China Hoping to 'Reshape the World' Together," Washington Post, April 12, 2005. 2. Shih Chun-yu, "China and India Explore New Type of Relationship between Big Powers," Ta Kung Pao, July 11, 2006. 3. "One Must Be Responsible for His Threats," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], February 28, 2005. 4. The reasons for China's withdrawal while maintaining its territorial claims remain in dispute. Beijing claims that it was to demonstrate the country's sincere desire to settle the dispute through negotiation. Indian analysts suspect that the Chinese leadership calculated that by maintaining claims to Arunachal Pradesh, it would have a bargaining chip for negotiations over the more valued Aksai Chin. Also, the PLA had simply reached its logistical limits in the harsh terrain. 5. Nancy Jetly, "Sino-Indian Relations: Old Legacies and New Vistas," China Report 30, no. 2 (April-June 1994): 220. 6. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 19. 7. Ibid. 8. Susan L. Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies toward India," The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, eds. Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 75 and 81. 9. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 53. 10. "Qian: Nuclear Arms Race Likely if India Doesn't Stop Tests," Zhongguo Xinwen She [Chinese News Service], May 19, 1998. 11. "What Is the Intention of Wantonly Engaging in Military Ventures," Jiefangjun Bao [People's Liberation Army Daily], May 19, 1998. 12. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 74-75, 80. 13. D. S. Rajan, "China: Views on Manmohan Singh-Bush Joint Statement," South Asia Analysis Group, August 8, 2005, available at http://www.saag.org//papers15/paper1490.html (accessed on August 31, 2006). 14. Lu Yansong, "Short-Sighted Nuclear Deal," Renmin Ribao, August 19, 2005. 15. For the best discussion of China's use of strategic proxies as an instrument of foreign policy, see Justin Bernier, "China's Strategic Proxies," Orbis 47, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 629-643. 16. "Behind U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation," Renmin Ribao, March 4, 2006. 17. "Pak, China to Sign Nuclear Deal," Asian Age, April 11, 2006. 18. Mohan Malik, "China Opposes U.S. Nuclear Deal for Fear of 'Losing' Influence," Force, May 21, 2006. 19. Embassy of the United States to India, "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," news release, June 28, 2005, available at http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html (accessed on August 19, 2006). 20. The notable exception in the region is Pakistan, which is a longstanding arms client of the United States. Indian strategists view each new arms sale to Islamabad as a betrayal, a continuing source of tension in bilateral relations. 21. Christopher Griffin, "What India Wants," Armed Forces Journal 143, no. 10 (May 1, 2006): 16-17. 22. "Washington Draws India in against China," Renmin Ribao, July 7, 2005, available at http://english.people.com.cn/20050707/print20050707_194676.html (accessed on August 14, 2006). 23. Christopher Griffin, "What India Wants," 17-18. 24. Sridhar Kumarawami, "Pranab Spells Out Look East Policy," Asian Age, June 12, 2006. 25. "China and India Cooperate to Find a Win-Win Path," Renmin Ribao, June 8, 2006. 26. Pravin Sawhney, "New Initiative," Force, June 13, 2006, available at http://www.forceindia.net/june/bottomline.asp(accessed on August 29, 2006). 27. Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, "The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation, Lessons from 1995–1990," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2006-2006): 169-186. 28. Hu Liang, "Expert Claims to Enhance Sino-Indian Relations," Ta Kung Pao, July 7, 2006. 29. For more on China's maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean, see Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across The Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 3-7. 30. Symbolizing the strength of the dispute was a recent international conference in New Delhi at which the Chinese consul general interrupted Mukherjee's remarks to announce that "China never invaded India! . . . It is untrue and irresponsible to say that China invaded India." "General Consul: China Never Invaded India," Renmin Ribao, September 8, 2005. 31. Pravin Sawhney, "New Initiative." 32. GDP figures are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators online database, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/home.htm. For crude oil imports data, see "PRC, India State-Run Firms Discuss Joint Bids for Oil Assets in Kazakhstan," Agence France Presse, June 8, 2006. 33. Indrajit Basu, "India Discreet, China Bold in Oil Hunt," Asia Times Online, September 29, 2005, available at www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html (accessed on May 5, 2006). 34. Amitav Ranjan, "Let's Shop for Oil, Gas Together: India, China," Indian Express, August 24, 2005, available at www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/full_story.php?content_id=76875 (accessed on May 5, 2006). 35. Anand Kumar, "Myanmar-Petrochina Agreement: A Setback to India's Quest for Energy Security," South Asia Analysis Group, January 19, 2006, available at http://saag.org//papers17Q681.html (accessed on May 5, 2006). 36. "China, India Sign Energy Agreement," China Daily Online, January 13, 2006, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/13/content_511871.htm (accessed on August 28, 2006). 37. Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11 (Carlisle, PA: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 33-35. 38. "India Supports Basic SCO Principles: Official," Xinhua, June 13, 2006. 39. "Game in Shanghai--Ignore SCO, but not Central Asia," Pioneer, June 17, 2006. 40. "China or Bust--SAARC in a Spin," The News International (Pakistan), November 13, 2005. 41. "Countering India," Asian Age, November 17, 2005. 42. Mohan Malik, "Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto," World Policy Journal 22, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 19-29. 43. Susan L. Shirk, "One-Sided Rivalry," 86-88. 44. Mohan Malik has also proposed a containment strategy explanation of Beijing's behavior towards India in his essay "China's Strategy of Containing India," published on February 6, 2006, by the Power and Interest News Report, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=434&languageid=1(accessed on September 3, 2006). 45. Trade has already shot up from $117.4 million in 1987 to $11.3 billion last year--a ninety-six-fold increase. Trade is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015, which is tremendous progress compared to recent growth but still paltry compared to the Sino-Japanese bilateral trade sum of $184.4 billion in 2005. "Sino-Indian Trade Could Reach $100 Billion by 2015," Agence France Presse, May 12, 2006; "India, China to Register Trade of 20 Bn US Dollars by 2007," Xinhua, March 16, 2006; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India, 25. 46. For an overview of Indian perceptions on improved Sino-Indian relations, see Julie A. MacDonald et al., Perspectives on China: A View from India (McLean, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005), 25-29.

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