Friday, October 10, 2008
Pranab's signing statement on the 123
"The agreeement has been passed by the U.S. Congress without amendments. Its provisions are now legally binding on both parties once it enters into force."
A good first step in clarifying India's understanding.
The Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India
The Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India
October 3, 2008
Democratic Ticket Barack Obama | Republican Ticket John McCain |
Joseph Biden Jr. | Sarah Palin |
Between its burgeoning economy and major nuclear deal with the United States, India's international profile has soared in recent years. Outsourcing to India and India's role combating environmental problems like climate change are among the issues that have figured in U.S. policy discussions. The Indian-American population neared two million as of the last census in 2000, and political lobbies like the U.S. India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) have become increasingly influential. Perhaps more than any past election, presidential candidates are making a concerted effort to appeal to this constituency and its top donors. Indian voters, according to USINPAC, want immigration reform, a strong geostrategic partnership between the United States and India, and a viable plan for combating HIV/AIDS and other public health crises in India.
All of the remaining candidates serving serving in Congress voted for groundbreaking legislation aimed at opening civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India as well as a range of other economic deals.
Democratic Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India
Obama has said he would build "a close strategic partnership" with India if he is elected president. Because India and the United States have both experienced major terrorist attacks, "we have a shared interest in succeeding in the fight against al-Qaeda and its operational and ideological affiliates," Obama wrote in a February 2008 article in India Abroad, a newspaper on Indian affairs published in New York.
The Obama campaign's June 2007 memo exposing Clinton's ties to India sparked an outcry from the Indian-American community. USINPAC denounced Obama's memo as "the worst kind of anti Indian American stereotyping." Obama apologized for the memo, which referred to Clinton as "Clinton (D-Punjab)" (Rediff.com).
Obama voted to approve the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in October 2008. He voted in favor of the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. In September 2008, Obama praised the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for deciding to allow its members to cooperate with India on nuclear issues.
South Asians for Obama published this list (PDF) of Obama's stances on issues of interest to the South Asian community in the United States.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Sen. Biden (D-DE) called U.S. ties with India the "single most important relationship that we have to get right for our own safety's sake" (Rediff.com). He faced criticism in 2006 for commenting that "you cannot go to a 7-Eleven or a Dunkin' Donuts unless you have a slight Indian accent" (AP). But, Biden says, he has had a "great relationship" with the growing Indian population in Delaware. Rediff.com called Biden "the driving force" behind the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, which was intended to help India develop its nuclear energy program. Biden voted to approve the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in October 2008. He called that bill's passage "a victory for U.S.-India relations," but said there is "still much to be done in India," including U.S. support for Indian energy production, counterterrorism, and public health efforts.
Biden cosponsored the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, which calls on the secretary of state to establish "petroleum crisis-response mechanisms with the governments of China and India."
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Sen. Clinton (D-NY) enjoys strong support from the Indian-American community (NY Sun). Indian Americans for Hillary 2008, founded by prominent hotelier Sant Singh Chatwal, plans to raise at least $5 million for the Clinton campaign (Hindustan Times).
With Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX), Clinton announced plans in April to form a Senate India Caucus (The Hindu), which she would cochair.
In June 2007, the Barack Obama campaign sparked controversy by circulating a memo accusing Clinton of pandering to the Indian-American community. That memo notes the "tens of thousands" Clinton has received from companies that outsource jobs to India.
Clinton voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006.
Editor's Note: Sen. Clinton withdrew her candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on June 7, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Sen. Dodd (D-CT) voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. Other than that, however, little is known about Dodd's stance on U.S. policy toward India.
Editor's Note: Sen. Dodd withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 3, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Edwards has said a "strong U.S.-Indian relationship will be one of my highest priorities" as president. He told the Indian American Center for Political Awareness that the United States and India should "enhance our efforts to cooperate in law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and nonproliferation." He also said he would support India's efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
In late 2005, Edwards said he was "generally supportive" of the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement.
Editor's note: Edwards dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination on January 30, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Gravel's stance on this issue is unknown.
Editor's Note: Mike Gravel ended his bid for the Democraticnomination on March 26, 2008. He then ran for the LibertarianParty's presidential nomination before announcing the end ofhis political career on May 25, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Rep. Kucinich (D-OH) opposed the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, arguing that it would "threaten global security and unilaterally modify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."
Kucinich also cosponsored a May 2007 House resolution that the United States "should address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India." That resolution passed in the House, but has not yet been voted in on the Senate.
Editor's Note: Rep. Kucinich withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 25, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Richardson says the relationship between the United States and India can potentially serve to deter extremism and counterbalance China economically. He also says India should join the G8.
Richardson says if elected, he would hold an Asian Energy Summit with India, China, Japan, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Environment Program to "adopt a ten-year strategy for a major energy transition in Asia."
In a January 2008 Foreign Affairs essay, Richardson praised the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, which he said will "help bring a great democracy, a natural ally of the United States, into the global nuclear regime."
Editor's Note: Richardson withdrew his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 10, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Republican Candidates on U.S. Policy toward India
Sen. McCain (R-AZ), has noted India's potential to be one of the "natural allies" of the United States. He stresses the "importance of securing greater U.S. market access to [India's] economy of a billion consumers."
In a March 2008 speech, McCain said he believes India should be included in the G-8.
McCain voted in favor of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in October 2008. He also voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006. In a May 2008 speech on nuclear security, McCain said he supports the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord "as a means of strengthening our relationship with the world's largest democracy, and further involving India in the fight against proliferation." He also said the United States should "engage actively" with India to "improve the security of nuclear stockpiles and weapons materials," and to construct a secure global nuclear order that eliminates the likelihood of proliferation and the possibility of nuclear conflict."
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Sen. Brownback (R-KS) calls India "one of our most important strategic partners in Asia." Like Richardson, he has stressed India's potential role as a "counterweight" to China's economy.
Brownback, who formerly chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, has long advocated engagement with India. In 1999, he called for an end to economic sanctions intended to force India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Brownback voted for the United States-India Energy Security Cooperation Act of 2006 in part, he said, because "India has protected its nuclear program for thirty years and has not proliferated."
Editor's Note: Sen. Brownback withdrew his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination on October 19, 2007.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Giuliani views India's rapidly growing economy as a potentially lucrative market, saying the United States should "take advantage" (CNBC) of the "large number of consumers that are emerging in India." In particular, Giuliani said, the U.S. stands to "make a lot of money in India" in new energy technology.
Editor's note: Giuliani dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 31, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Huckabee's stance on this issue is unknown.
Editor's Note: Huckabee withdrew his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on March 4, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Rep. Hunter (R-CA) has often expressed concern that too many U.S. jobs are being outsourced to countries like India and China.
Hunter voted for the U.S.and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.
Editor's note: Hunter dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 19, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Rep. Paul (R-TX) has addressed India in terms of U.S. policy towards Iran. He says U.S. "provision of nuclear materials to India is a clear violation of the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)], which contradicts "anti-Iran voices" claiming that Iran is violating the NPT. In fact, says Paul, Iran is entitled under the NPT to develop nuclear power "for peaceful purposes." Further, he argued, "If Iran had a nuclear weapon, why would this be different from Pakistan, India, and North Korea having one? Why does Iran have less right to a defensive weapon than these other countries?"
Paul opposed the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.
Editor's Note: Rep. Paul withdrew his candidacy for theRepublican presidential nomination on June 12, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Romney views India as potentially profitable for U.S. marketing and investment, due to its flourishing economy and huge population. Romney said in 2005 that although outsourcing to countries like India is a problem, "we'll see new opportunities created selling products there. We'll have a net increase in economic activity, just as we did with free trade."
Editor's note: Romney dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on February 7, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Rep. Tancredo (R-CO), whose candidacy focused almost exclusively on immigration issues, has not often spoken about India. However, his failed proposal to end the H-1B visa program during the 108th Congress may have turned some Indian-American voters against him. USINPAC has called for the cap on H-1B visas to be eliminated altogether.
Tancredo voted for the U.S.and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006.
With Rep. Kucinich and others, Tancredo cosponsored a May 2007 House resolution calling on the United States to "address the ongoing problem of untouchability in India." That resolution has not yet been voted on.
Editor's Note: Congressman Tancredo formally withdrew his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination on December 20, 2007.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
Thompson's stance on this issue is unknown.
Editor's note: Thompson dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on January 22, 2008.
Click here for this candidate's position on other top foreign policy issues.
The former health and human services secretary has boasted of a "productive bilateral relationship" with India in the fight against HIV/AIDS. He cited funding granted for Indian scientists on AIDS vaccine research and for the expansion of "government and free market interventions in HIV, TB, and malaria treatment and prevention efforts" there.
Darshan Dhaliwal, the Indian-born head of Bulk Petroleum (Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel), has pledged to raise $1 million for the Thompson campaign.
Editor's note: Thompson dropped out of the race for the Republican nomination on August 12, 2007.
Thursday, October 02, 2008
Australia must now help a nuclear India
Australia must now help a nuclear India
- Neville Roach
- October 3, 2008
The reduction of carbon emissions can be tied to uranium sales.
THE deal on nuclear trade struck between George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved by the United States Congress on Wednesday marks a new era in US-India relations. This agreement, and that with France that followed the September decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow resumption of nuclear trade with India, herald a new de facto non-proliferation framework that has profound implications for Australia's policies on climate change and the exporting of uranium.
No country faces a harder task of responding to climate change than India. With one of the lowest per capita carbon footprints in the world, it has to reduce emissions while needing more energy to sustain its recent economic growth. Clearly, with the world's largest carbon footprint, Australia has a moral obligation to make it easier, rather than more difficult, for India to generate energy in the least polluting way.
To tackle its challenge,
India will have to implement every carbon-efficient energy solution available, including solar, wind, biofuels, natural and coal seam gas and the solution strongly advocated by Australia, clean coal. However, the most effective and immediately available solution is unquestionably nuclear power, which produces zero carbon emissions.
To expand its nuclear power production substantially, India needs secure access to the latest technology as well as uranium ore. The importance of gaining such access led Singh to risk his Government by seeking a confidence vote in the Indian Parliament linked to the US nuclear deal.
As the suppliers group decision does not require India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Australian Government
will need to review its longstanding policy to export uranium only to NPT signatories. This will have profound implications for Australia's relations with India and the world's response to climate change.
A key recommendation of the Prime Minister's 2020 summit was to engage more actively with Australia's four major regional economies — the US, Japan, China and India. The recommendation reflects India's growing importance regionally and globally. Australia is one of the biggest beneficiaries of India's rapid economic growth (Australia has a trade surplus of more than $10 billion a year) and is a major source of skilled migrants, overseas students and tourists.
The Australian Government is paying much more attention to India than ever before.
Trade Minister Simon Crean and Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith have visited India this year and have hosted visits to Australia by their Indian counterparts. The
Prime Minister is reported to be planning a visit later this year. However, the uranium issue poses the greatest opportunity, as well as threat, to the bilateral relationship.
The Rudd Government has shown great courage and global leadership by unilaterally committing to a reduction in carbon emissions by 2020 and a carbon trading regime by 2010.
By taking the moral high ground, Australia is in a strong position to persuade other major emitters to follow suit. This influence can be decisive in relation to India if Australia requires it to commit to a reduction in emissions as a prerequisite for access to this country's uranium.
Australia's willingness to support the suppliers group decision and to decouple the issue of uranium exports from the group's waiver has been extremely well received in India and is proof of Australia's commitment to closer relations with India. We now need to go one step further.
While the suppliers group decision lifts the ban on nuclear trade, actual trade depends on bilateral negotiation between individual members and India. The US and French deals, with Russia certain to follow suit, will collectively meet India's technology requirements.
However, the reliable supply of uranium has still to be secured. While Canada is rumoured
to be willing to become a supplier, Australia, with the world's largest uranium reserves, holds the key.
Australia has an excellent record of adapting its policies to changing regional and global realities. A good example was the recognition of China by
the Whitlam government, a visionary decision that has yielded enormous benefits to Australia, our region and the world. A change in policy in relation to uranium exports to India would be equally visionary and generate similar outcomes.
The suppliers group decision does not preclude individual suppliers setting their own conditions for nuclear trade with India. This is what the US and France have done. Australia, too, can and should negotiate its own conditions to deal with its legitimate concerns. India's strong commitment and outstanding record in relation to non-proliferation should encourage the Rudd Government to find a win-win solution.
Without nuclear power, India cannot meet its energy needs as it strives to lift hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty. The good news is that the more India relies on nuclear power, the greater its ability to minimise carbon emissions. Australia will be seen as a true and reliable friend if it helps India in its hour of need.
Neville Roach is chairman emeritus of the Australia-India Business Council.
Saturday, September 20, 2008
US-India nuclear bond? - Washington Times
HAWKINS: U.S.-India nuclear bond?
William Hawkins
Sunday, September 21, 2008
COMMENTARY:
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Sept. 11 said she supports waiving House rules to speed passage of the U.S.-India nuclear trade agreement by the end of the year. "It does have support in the House," she said. The seventh anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, with its focus on national security, was an apt time for the speaker to talk about the pact with India. The agreement has diplomatic implications that extend far beyond even its substantial economic benefits.
Passage of the agreement with India would be a positive contrast to the U.S. cancellation of a nuclear deal with Russia on Sept. 8. The Russian deal would have allowed Moscow to establish a lucrative business in the import and storage of spent nuclear fuel from U.S.-supplied reactors around the world.
Given Russia's ties to rogue regimes like Iran, and questions about security at its existing nuclear sites, making it a global center for nuclear fuel storage seemed like a bad idea from its inception. The deal got a deservedly cool reception when sent to Congress for approval in May. Russia's invasion of Georgia led President George W. Bush to pull the agreement.
The U.S.-India pact has had its American critics. Sen. Joe Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, raised initial concerns at an April 2006 hearing, arguing, "We must not undermine world support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by saying that nuclear weapons are fine for our friends." Yet this is exactly what the United States has done for the last 60 years, and must continue to do in the real world of global power politics.
The United States directly helped Great Britain's nuclear development during the Cold War. France developed an independent nuclear deterrent. While this was often disquieting to American leaders, it was not considered a threat like the weapons deployed by Russia or China. Israel is believed to have nuclear arms, but Washington has rightly refused to consider this as the moral equivalent of an Iranian bomb. Treating friends and rivals differently is the essence of foreign policy.
Mr. Biden now supports the agreement. Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, also had some initial reservations, but on Sept. 7 hailed its approval by the 45-nation Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). He called for the deal to "expeditiously" win Senate approval, saying it is "another building block in the partnership between our two countries."
Because India is not a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty, it needed a waiver by the NSG. The agreement does have nonproliferation elements. India will place all future civilian nuclear reactors, and 14 of its current 22 reactors, under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. It will also continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. But it will not stop building nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them because of the dangerous geopolitical situation with which New Delhi must contend. India is situated between radical Islamic states to the west and a rising China to the east.
The United States cannot afford to treat India as a nation inferior in standing to China, which is rapidly building both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said Washington understands "India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the Indians said that its plans and policies must take into account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that India would accept what would amount to an arms control agreement that did not include other key countries, like China and Pakistan." Miss Rice met with Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony on Sept. 10 to put finishing touches on the agreement.
Wisdom is the ability to judge how things differ on their merits. India is clearly not Iran or North Korea. India already has a fledgling nuclear arsenal and an expanding atomic energy program. India first conducted an underground nuclear test in 1974, prompted by China's entry into the nuclear club 10 years earlier.
India then renounced the development of such weapons and as late as 1988 was calling for U.N. talks to eliminate all nuclear arms. But the rapid rise of China and the increased militancy of Pakistan heightened regional tensions. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, bringing new American sanctions against both countries. The sanctions on New Delhi were lifted in 2001 as President Bush gave improving relations with India a high priority.
The U.S.-India nuclear pact is an important step in creating a stabler diplomatic alignment in Asia that can support U.S. security interests in the region.
William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in defense and trade issues.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
India is hungry for our uranium
Short of energy and uranium, and with an ambitious civil-nuclear program, India is hungry for imported uranium.
Given India has one of the world's lowest per capita rates of energy consumption and a high economic growth rate, the country has an urgent requirement for additional sources of ''clean'' energy in order to develop without contributing overly to global warming.
India is working hard to develop renewable energy sources, but these cannot cope with the rapid rise in demand. It is, therefore, burning increasing amounts of low-grade coal, which it has in abundance. In these circumstances, India regards nuclear energy as an important part of its future energy mix.
Australian uranium is not absolutely essential to India's civil nuclear program, because other countries such as Russia, France, and even China, would provide fuel should Australia refuse.
Burgeoning Australian sales on to world markets will have the general effect of loosening markets, even should Australia refuse to sell directly to India.
But India cannot understand why Australia has refused to sell to it, while agreeing to sell to China, given what India regards as China's somewhat dubious reputation on horizontal proliferation and its lack of democratic credentials. It regards sale of uranium as an ''earnest of intent'' in circumstances in which Australia has reiterated the importance of the relationship.
All that is not enough in itself to justify an Australian decision to sell, but it should be weighed up in the equation. Australia also needs to be mindful of counter-proliferation demands, and Labor needs to resolve some pressing internal issues in relation to nuclear energy.
As to the latter, it would have been a ''bridge too far'' for the Rudd Government to have agreed to sell uranium to India in an election environment and on the back of a decision to abandon the three-mines policy. Labor was also able to make electoral capital out of the Coalition's discomfiture on nuclear power and the ''not in my backyard'' syndrome. But those exigencies of the election campaign have now passed.
So the key issue becomes: would an Australian agreement to sell to India significantly undermine the non-proliferation regime?
Given the 54-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (which includes Australia) and the US itself would have agreed to free up India's civil nuclear program should current proposals proceed, it is difficult to see how an Australian holdout would make any difference in terms of proliferation, other than helping to keep Australia's credentials pure.
Should India be successfully inducted into the global civil-nuclear regime, we would have what would amount to a three-tier system one in which the N5 states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) would be at the top as ''legitimate'' nuclear weapons states; then would come India as a ''responsible'', but not fully legitimate, nuclear weapons state; and beneath that would be Pakistan and Israel.
This category of ''responsible'' nuclear weapons states would have all the normal strictures against horizontal proliferation applying to it, since its members would effectively have acceded to the IAEA non-proliferation regime.
Membership of the second tier would have the additional benefit of enhancing civil-nuclear safety regimes. This is an important issue for India, which cannot avoid constructing reactors near heavily populated areas, however, the existence of such a category could also be seen as an incentive to proliferate or at least as the removal of the existing disincentive built around the effective isolation from global civil nuclear trade.
There is also a wider argument concerning India's induction into the civil nuclear regime that goes beyond proliferation and greenhouse concerns.
India's rise as a responsible Asian power will greatly depend on the relationships it forges with the US and its allies such as Australia and Japan. An India left out of the civil nuclear regime would be less likely to support the current treaty regime and its objectives. And, given India's imminent rise as an important Asian strategic and economic power, this could have considerable impact on the regime itself.
So it makes sense for the Rudd Government to support India's induction into the global civil nuclear regime.
Dr Sandy Gordon is a visiting fellow with the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the ANU and author of India's Rise to Power.
Wednesday, July 09, 2008
A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (2007)
From: Siddharth Varadarajan <svaradarajan@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jul 10, 2008 at 1:26 AM
Subject: A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (2007)
To: Siddharth Varadarajan <svaradarajan@gmail.com>
A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era
Andrew Krepinevich
Robert O. Work
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen/R.20070420.A_New_Global_Defen.pdf
Remaining to be seen is the impact that a growing US relationship with India will have on the
broader US Asian defense posture. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in 2005,
"Now India is, in effect, a strategic partner, not because of compatible domestic structures but
because of parallel security interests in Southwest Asia and the Indian ocean, and vis-à-vis
radical Islam."552 However, delays to a proposed deal between the United States and India over
US support for the development of India's commercial nuclear infrastructure prevented any
further deepening of the strategic ties between the two countries. However, on December 8,
2006, a bill proposing US-India civilian nuclear cooperation was passed by an overwhelming
majority in both the US House of Representatives and the Senate, ending the long period of
uncertainty over the fate of the deal and paving the way for improved relations between the two
countries.553 Given India's location in South Asia, the United States has many incentives to
continue to develop this strategic relationship, which may someday lead to potential new access
agreements and arrangements in the Indian Ocean.
CSBA -- Role of India in US dissuasion strategy for China
Congressional Briefing, US Capitol
May 6, 2008
Bob Martinage
Senior Fellow, CSBA
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg/S.20080506.Dissuasion_Strateg.pdf
http://csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra/B.20080326.A_Cooperative_Stra.pdf
US should exploit the manifold concerns/
grievances of China's neighbors to both deepen
and diversify America's alliance network in Asia
Dissuade PRC from investing in
"disruptive" capabilities by
channeling investment into
relatively non-threatening areas
– Facilitate India's development of a bluewater
navy (or otherwise increase the
perceived threat to PRC SLOCs) to
encourage PRC investment in bluewater
capabilities sooner, more
vigorously, and on a larger scale than
might otherwise be the case
– Ratchet up the perceived threat to
China's home waters posed by US
attack submarines, encouraging the
PLA to shift more resources into
coastal ASW capabilities
Dissuade PRC from investing
in "disruptive" capabilities by
channeling investment into
relatively non-threatening
areas (continued)
– Expand US base-access
agreements in Central Asia to
compel the PLA to invest in more
air defenses in Western/Northern
military districts