Remarks on conferring the Bernardo O'Higgins Order

Remarks on conferring the Bernardo O'Higgins Order
on Mr. Siddharth Varadarajan, Deputy Editor,The Hindu

Good evening, and welcome to the house of Chile in India. As head of
mission, I have to do many things, but there is little doubt that one of
the most gratifying is to recognize the achievements of distinguished
Indians who have contributed, in one way or another, to enhance ties with
Chile, and the Order Bernardo O'Higgins is one way to do that.

The Order itself was established half a century ago, in 1956, to
recognize foreign citizens for their outstanding contribution to the arts,
sciences, education, industry, commerce or social and human cooperation.
The order is conferred by the President of the Republic of Chile at the
proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Norma and I have been in India a little under two-and-a-half years. You
may know the story of the visitor to India who, after two weeks in India
says,"this is an extraordinary country, I must write a book about it";
after two months, he says, "this is a great place, I must write an article
about it", and after two years, he throws his hands up, and says "this is
so overwhelming, there is nothing I can write ". Presumably, we find
ourselves in the third stage of this "shock and awe" of Western visitors
to Mother India. Yet, of the many things that have struck me in my Indian
sojourn, I would single out two.

One of them is the enormous respect for the intellect.I don't think
there are many countries in the world where the President has a PhD in
physics and is an accomplished scientist, and the Primer Minister has a PhD
in economics and is an accomplished economist. This is not just a
coincidence, but a reflection of a nation where education, research and the
pursuit of knowledge are highly valued.

The second is the role of the Indian media and especially the press. It
is often said that we live in a media-driven age.If that is the case, I
would posit to you that there are few countries in the world where the
press makes such a significant contribution to the national debate, where
it takes up with such gusto the role of what in Greece was known as the
agora, or the public square, the place where citizens engage each other and
the issues facing the state. Both in its detailed and no-holds barred
reporting of current events, and in its analysis and dissection of them, it
enriches enormously the fabric and the texture of Indian democracy. This,
of course, is in the best deliberative traditions of this country, that go
back to Ashoka and Akbar, as Amartya Sen has reminded us in his recent and
remarkable book The Argumentative Indian. At the same time, as India opens
up to the rest of the world, and engages in what has been described as The
Global Indian Takeover, this high-quality coverage has also been extended
to international affairs.

And it is in recognition of his extraordinary contribution to the
informed and well-documented analysis of international affairs in general,
and of Latin America and Chile in particular, that we gather today to
honour a young journalist and analyst, who in his little over ten years
with the Indian press, first with the world's largest English-language
broadsheet, the venerable Times of India, and, more recently, with The
Hindu, India's "newspaper of record", has already made his mark, by his
sharp reporting and trenchant analyses.

You could, of course, argue that it was all in the genes. Siddharth
is the son of a distinguished IAS officer, Mr Muthusamy Varadarajan, who
was Secretary Culture, and of Usha, a highly successful businesswoman in
her own right, both of whom are here with us this evening-- as is his wife,
Nandini, a professor at Delhi University. His brother Tunku edits the
opinion page of one of the world's leading newspapers, The Wall Street
Journal, so that one could say that their parents provided them not only
with the right genes, but also with something else.

I suppose being educated at the London School of Economics and
Political Science and at Columbia University, including doctoral studies in
Economics, also helps, as does a stint of teaching at New York University,
and speaking five languages. The same goes for being well-traveled, and
Siddharth has visited over 60 countries, including many in Latin America,
and, of course, Chile, where he developed a weakness for our famous
aperitif, pisco sour.

Now, while it is true that Siddharth has kept himself quite active on
the academic front, having edited a book Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy,
published by Penguin, publishing chapters in scholarly volumes, and
presenting papers at international conferences, the Bernardo O'Higgins
Order is given to him mainly for his extraordinary contribution to Indian
journalism, mostly over the past couple of years.

His supple prose, sharp analysis and always well-documented pieces on
many issues of world affairs have brought to Indian readers the sort of
perspective on issues of concern to the public of South Asia and its
environs that is often not even available in the world's best newspapers.
To be able to communicate highly complex issues of war and peace in
straightforward language that is accessible to newspaper readers is the
task of today's diplomatic correspondent, and this is an art that Siddarth
Varadarjan has mastered like few others. To avoid the extremes of turgid,
impenetrable academic prose, on the one hand, and of the vacuous, breezy
writing that passes for reporting in today's seemingly ever shorter news
items, on the other, is not an easy thing to do. But it is something that
Siddharth is in full command of: he writes with a light touch about weighty
matters.

In television ,as well as in the press, it is often argued that
international news is a "loss-leader", meaning viewers and readers are more
interested in local than in world affairs, as a result of which they are
left to international news organizations and outlets, which in many ways
only compounds the problem. The latter often provide either a highly
sanitized version of them ( so that they can reach as broad a market as
possible) or they come with their own biases. The real challenge for
journalism in the developing world, of course, is to cover world affairs
from our own national perspectives, allowing viewers and readers to
identify with them and fully appreciate their implications.

This is what Siddharth Varadarajan has done, first from the pages of The
Times of India, and now from those of The Hindu. Only last Saturday, we
had not one, but two pieces of him in the editorial pages of the latter, an
uncommon occurrence in contemporary journalism, but one that reveals that
he has much to say on the developments of the day.

It is often said that journalism provides the first draft of history.
Well, I would like to submit to you that when the history of South and
Central Asia and their interactions with the rest of the world, including
Latin America, is written in the future, the inputs provided to it by
Siddharth Varadarajan will take pride of place. Thank you.

Jorge Heine

30 March 2006
Shantiniketan
New Delhi

U.S. Proposal for Changes to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines Circulated March 2006

Daryl G. Kimball
March 27, 2006

As part of the proposal for full civil nuclear cooperation with India as outlined by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in their July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, Bush pledged to seek India-specific exceptions to NSG guidelines adopted at the United States' urging in 1992 that restrict trade with non-nuclear-weapon states (including India) that do not accept full-scope IAEA safeguards.

In the days before a March 22-23 consultative group meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Vienna, the United States circulated a draft text for possible adoption by the 45-member group, which operates by consensus.

According to sources, the meeting included a general discussion of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation proposal, but apparently no specific discussion on the proposed U.S. text that would create a loophole in NSG trade restrictions. Thirty delegations spoke. As expected, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom expressed general support for the proposal, but the rest, including Japan and China, asked numerous questions, many of which were very critical.

The skeptical reaction of the majority of NSG members represents a setback for the Bush administration. There was no agreement to put the U.S. proposal on the formal agenda of the NSG Plenary meeting May 29-June 2 in Brazil. This situation could theoretically change, but even if the United States works quickly to revise its proposed changes to NSG guidelines to make a country-specific exemption for India, it is highly unlikely that the NSG states will agree to act on the initiative at the upcoming meeting.

Brief Analysis

India-specific exemptions from NSG guidelines would erode the credibility of the NSG's effort to restrict legitimate peaceful nuclear trade only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards. The U.S. proposal could invite other nuclear supplier states to seek exemptions for their preferred nuclear trading partners that don't yet meet the NSG's standards and/or prompt nuclear supplier states to simply ignore the NSG's voluntary guidelines, as Russia has already done by re-supplying India's two Tarapur light-water reactors this month. (Russia had announced in December 2004 that it would not re-supply the Tarapur reactors but changed its position sometime after Bush and Singh announced their proposal for civil nuclear cooperation.)

One of the most notable and troublesome features of the U.S. proposal is the weak and very ambiguous language in section 2, which is ostensibly meant to outline what India must do in order to qualify for transfers of NSG trigger list items. In addition, section 4 would allow individual NSG members to decide whether India is meeting these weak standards before they sell nuclear technology and materials (possibly including technologies the United States would not be willing to sell) to India.

Section 4 says in part: Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India (a State not party, and never having been a party, to the NPT) as long as the participating Government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other requirements of the NSG Guidelines.

In essence, the Bush administration is proposing an NSG rule-change that would not only erode rules-based efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, but it would also allow other states to interpret the India-specific rule as they see fit and undermine how U.S. policymakers would like to see such a rule applied.

---

[U.S. Government Circulated] Draft
Pre-Decisional

Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India

1. At the [blank] Plenary meeting on [blank] the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed that they:
   1. Desire to contribute to an effective non-proliferation regime, and to the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
   2. Seek to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons
   3. Wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the conduct of those outside the Treaty
   4. Seek to promote international cooperation in the research, development and safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and e. Recognize the promise of nuclear power in India as a clean source of energy for sustained economic growth and prosperity.
2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken as a contributing partner in the nonproliferation regime and they welcome India’s efforts with respect to the following commitments and actions:
   1. Having publicly designated peaceful civil nuclear facilities which will be submitted to IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.
   2. Having committed to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, and to work with others towards achievement of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
   3. Having committed to accept an Additional Protocol covering designated civil nuclear facilities.
      
   4. Having committed to support international efforts to restrain the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.
   5. Having adopted a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear related material, equipment, and technology.
      
   6. Having agreed to adhere formally to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.
3. For these reasons, Participating Governments have therefore adopted the following policy on civil nuclear cooperation by Participating Governments with the peaceful safeguarded Indian civil nuclear power program.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), of INFCIRC/254/Part 1 as revised, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India (a State not party, and never having been a party, to the NPT) as long as the participating Government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other requirements of the NSG Guidelines.
5. Participating Governments, in accordance with Paragraph 4(d), will continue to strive for the earliest possible implementation of the policy referred to in paragraph 4(a).
6. The NSG Point of Contact is requested to submit this Statement to the IAEA DG with a request that he circulate it to all Member States.

Anglo-American plans for Iran at the UN: The Sawers letter

From the London Times of 22 March 2006.

John Sawers, a leading British diplomat, outlined his strategy for winning Russian and Chinese support for tougher action against Iran in a confidential letter dated March 16. It was addressed to his counterparts in France, Germany and the US:

Stanislas de Laboulaye, Michael Schaefer, Nick Burns, Robert Cooper.

Nick, Michael and I had a word yesterday about how to handle the E3+3 meeting in New York on Monday. We agreed that we would need to have a shared concept of what would happen in the Security Council after the period specified by the proposed Presidential Statement. I agreed to circulate a short paper which we might use as a sort of speaking note with the Russians and Chinese. This is attached.

Implicit in the paper is a recognition that we are not going to bring the Russians and Chinese to accept significant sanctions over the coming months, certainly not without further efforts to bring the Iranians around.

Kislyak might argue that those diplomatic efforts should start straightaway after a Presidential Statement is adopted. Our own assessment here is that the Iranians will not feel under much pressure from PRST on its own, and they will need to know that more serious measures are likely. This means putting the Iran dossier onto a Chapter VII basis. We may also need to remove one of the Iranian arguments that the suspension called for is ‘voluntary’. We could do both by making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement to the Security Council, in a Resolution we would aim to adopt I, say, early May.

In return for the Russians and Chinese agreeing to this, we would then want to put together a package that could be presented to the Iranians as a new proposal. Ideally this would have the explicit backing of Russia, China and the United States as well as the E3, though Nick will want to consider the scope of presenting this in that way. Our thought is that we would need to finalise this during June, and the obvious occasion to do so would be in the margins of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The period running up to the G8 Summit will be when our influence on Russia will be at its maximum, and we need to plan accordingly.

In parallel with agreeing a new proposal, we will also want to bind Russia and China into agreeing to further measures that will be taken by the Security Council should the Iranians fail to engage positively. That would be reflected in Step Four. We would not, at this stage, want to be explicit about what would be involved then – there will need to be extensive negotiations on that in May/June.

I am not sure how far we will get on Monday. The prospect of an E3+3 Ministerial in Berlin on 30 March would give Kislyak the opportunity to push this down the road by ten days. But I suspect we will need a meeting at Ministerial level anyway to get agreement to this sort of approach, including an early Chapter VII Resolution.

We have earmarked a conference call between the five of us on Friday afternoon. Can I suggest that we do this at 1530 GMT. We will need to be circumspect on an open line, but as we are not planning to hand a paper over to the Russians and Chinese, I don’t think we need to go into detailed drafting. What we need is agreement on the concepts.

Looking forward to seeing you all in New York on Monday."

The draft changes to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act

This is the text of the amendment to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act proposed by the Bush administration in order to move its nuclear deal with India forward. Via armscontrolwonk.

Authority relating to U.S.-India nuclear cooperation.

This provision facilitates civil nuclear cooperation with India by authorizing the President to waive certain requirements in order to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with India under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA).

The waiver is dependent on a Presidential determination that India has taken steps to fulfill the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement of the President and India Prime Minister Singh. These understanding call on India to separate its civil nuclear program under International Atomic Energy safeguards; and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

By authorizing exemption from certain AEA requirements, the provision authorizes the President to submit a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress under the Congressional review procedures of sections 123(b) and 123(d) of the AEA that would allow for it to enter into force after the expiration of a 90-continuous day period.

Section XX. Waiver Authority –

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the President makes the determinations described in subsection (b), he may:

(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended) from the requirement in section 123(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, and such agreement for cooperation shall be subject to the same congressional review procedures under sections 123(b) and 123(d) as an agreement for cooperation that has not been exempted from any requirement contained in section 123(a);

(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India; and

(3) waive the application of any section under section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India.

(b) The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following actions have occurred:

(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA;

(2) An agreement has entered into force between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1) above;

(3) India and the IAEA are making satisfactory progress toward implementing an Additional Protocol that would apply to India civil nuclear program;

(4) India is working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;

(5) India is supporting international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology;

(6) India is ensuring that the necessary steps are being taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines; and

(7) Supply to India by the United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act is consistent with U.S. participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

(c) Any determination pursuant to subsection (b) shall be reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives, and such report shall describe the basis for the President's determination.
(d) A determination under subsection (b) shall not be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of enactment of this Act.

Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan

This is the complete text of the document titled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan" tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006.

Implementation of the India-United States Joint
Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan

The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States arose in the context of India's requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by discussions between the two Governments, particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and rising oil prices. These developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-US Energy Dialogue that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear energy. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time, they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner, more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with the environmental implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven and wide-ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to make to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development Partnership.

2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July 2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part, the United States undertook to:

• Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation.
• Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
• In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur expeditiously.
• To consult with its partners to consider India's participation in ITER.
• To consult with other participants in the Generation-IV International Forum with a view towards India's inclusion.

3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for its part undertook the following commitments:

• Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner.
• Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.
• Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and
• Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities.

4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last year. Among them are:

• India's responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US, continues and is reflected in its policies and actions.
• The harmonization of India's export controls with NSG [Nuclear Suppliers' Group] and MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Guidelines even though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and control lists have been notified and are being implemented.
• A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation regulations and export controls has taken place as a result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May 2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine and amend other relevant Acts as well as framing appropriate rules and regulations.
• Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread. This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.
• Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and
• Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

5. The Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, recognized that India is ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges that India's nuclear programme has both a military and a civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose was not to constrain India's strategic programme but to enable resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to enhance global energy and environmental security. Such cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any international civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should, firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly, should not be transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These concepts will be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with IAEA.

6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear weapons not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must be appreciated that the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have no strategic implications poses a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security significance of materials and the location of the facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.

7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs [pressurised heavy water reactors] chosen for deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were set up, several innovative design improvements were carried out based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back end. Success in the technologies for the back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all technology objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and incorporating inherent safety features.

8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise. Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic viability, as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or not civilian.

9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed viable by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically:

Country / Number of reactors / Total installed capacity

India / 15 / 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the total production)

USA / 104 (103 operational) / 99.21 GWe (19.9% of the total production)

France / 59 / 63.36 GWe (78.1% of the total production)

UK / 23 / 11.85 GWe (19.4% of the total production)

Russia / 31 / 21.74 GWe (1.6% of the total production)

China / 9 / 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the total production)

Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC

10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside safeguards. Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be important to look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of installed capacity covered. An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller than the standards reactor in a P-5 economy. The chart below illustrates this aspect:

Country / Most common reactor / No. of such reactors

India / PHWRs 220 MWe / 12

USA / 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs. Most plants are in the range of range of 1000-1250 MWe / 51 reactors in the range of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe

France / PWRs of 900 MWe and 1300 MWe size / 34 PWrs of 900 MWe and 20 PWRs of 1300 MWe

UK / No standard size. AGR is the most common in the range of 600-700 MWe / 14 AGRs

Russia / 3rd Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and RBMK 1000 Light Water Graphite Reactors / 9 third Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK 1000 Light Water Fraphite Reactors

China / PWRs 984 MWe / Four

Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne

11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5 nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise significantly as fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.

12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by the following principles:

• Credible, feasible and implementable in a transparent manner;
• Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
• Consistent with India's national security and R&D requirements as well as not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
• Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
• Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.

13. Based on these principles, India will:

• Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that, after separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance.
• The overarching criterion would be a judgment whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India's national security.
• However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally engaged in activities of strategic significance.
• A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that India has determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme.

14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the US, will adopt the following approach:

(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in addition KK 1&2 that are under construction. 8 other PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220 MW, will also be offered. Phasing of specific thermal power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be indicated separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction to be placed under safeguards, and would raise the total installed Thermal Power capacity by MWs under safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2014.

(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development.

(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.

(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor that was purchased from France outside BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre] and make the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards in 2010.

(v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified and separated as civilian:

• List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.
• The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not consider these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.

(vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would be identified and separated as civilian:

• India is willing to accept safeguards in the `campaign' mode after 2010 in respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
• The Tarapur and Rajasthan `Away From Reactors' spent fuel storage pools would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing between 2006-2009.

(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:

(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre

(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics

(d) Institute for Plasma Research

(e) Institute of Mathematics Sciences

(f) Institute of Physics

(g) Tata Memorial Centre

(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology

i) Harish Chandra Research Institute

These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play a prominent role in international cooperation.

15. Safeguards:

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

(i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

(ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

(iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

(iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by the Government.

March 2, 2006

Media inquiries

If you are a print or web-based news organisation looking for a quote on any of the subjects I cover, please drop me an email at sv1965[at]gmail.com. Many of my columns are reproduced on Znet in North America. Fair use and not-for-profit reprinting or reproducing or translating is all right but for any commercial use, you will need prior permission from me or my newspaper, The Hindu, where my work appears.

If you are an overseas radio or television station looking for a comment from me in English, Hindi or Urdu, please email me in advance so we can set up time.

If you need a comment from me on an emergency basis, you may call me on my cell phone (+91-98111-60260) but please bear in mind that India is 5.5 hours ahead of GMT and 9.5/10.5 hours ahead of EST.

Select television interviews

The Charlie Rose Show on India and the world[28 February 2006]
Australian Broadcasing Corporation on India's new Employment Guarantee Scheme [14 September 2005]
Australian Broadcasing Corporation on what's wrong with an India-U.S. alliance [14 August 2005]
PBS on the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India [24 May 2002]

As and when I locate video or transcript links for my interviews on Doordarshan, NDTV, CNN-IBN, CNBC (all in India), Geo-TV and IndusTV (in Pakistan) and BBC World, I will uplink these as well.

Radio

Listen to me being interviewed by David Barsamian on Alternative Radio

I am a frequent commentator on All-India Radio, BBC World Service, BBC Hindi Service, BBC Urdu Service, and National Public Radio [listen to two of my NPR audio bites here and here], and an occasional commentator on Deutsche Welle Hindi and Urdu service, ABC radio (Australia) [click here for the transcript of an interview I gave ABC on media and the war on terror], Radio Television Hong Kong and CBC radio (Canada).

Chat

'PM bigger lame duck than Bush'. Transcript of live chat on rediff.com [27 February 2006]

For my complete web archive, click here.